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Introduction 
 
A half measure, like a little knowledge, may be a dangerous thing. 
Incremental actions can prove to be a stepping stone, easing the way to 
climbing higher, or a stumbling block, a barrier that makes advancement more 
difficult. The risks of partial measures are particularly important in politics. 
Policymakers are constantly faced with the dilemma of whether to spend 
political capital on an ambitious proposal or to settle for a partial measure with 
the hope that it eventually will create greater support for the more ambitious 
plan. Depending on the circumstances, incrementalism can be a successful 
strategy or can prove counterproductive. 
The costs and benefits of incrementalism are becoming increasingly 
relevant to discussions about controlling global warming. The threats posed by 
global climate change are well-known. The scientific data showing that the 
planet’s increasing stock of greenhouse gases will lead to massive environmental 
change are no longer seriously contested. It is now routine to hear about the 
dire consequences of inaction—the extinction of animal and plant species, 
rising ocean levels, and dramatically higher rates of malaria and cancer, among 
other concerns. Public debate in the United States and around the world is no 
longer focused on whether action needs to be taken to address climate change 
but on what actions are best. 
The consensus answer is that, ultimately, the only effective solution to the 
problem of climate change will be a multilateral agreement. The alternative—a 
series of uncoordinated national-level measures—is not an effective means of 
limiting greenhouse gases to sustainable levels because of international 
disagreements on how to divide greenhouse gas emissions among nations and 
because of the problem of carbon leakage. Currently, there is no consensus over 
how greenhouse gas emissions rights should be divided among states. Even 
assuming that all nations adopt some climate change regulations, if they do so 
with different principles of dividing global carbon emissions, then these 
uncoordinated national measures will not avoid a climate change crisis. For 
instance, if the United States and the European Union adopt national-level 
measures to decrease greenhouse gas production based on a historic level of 
emissions while China and India adopt national-level measures based on a per 
capita standard, global greenhouse gas levels will remain above sustainable 
levels. This is not because any state is trying to sabotage climate change 
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mitigation efforts but rather because each state will adopt national measures 
that fit its own conception of a fair division of global greenhouse gases. 
At the same time, carbon leakage undercuts nonglobal efforts to reduce 
levels of greenhouse gases. Because there are no purely local benefits to climate 
change mitigation efforts—benefits for the regulating state come from its 
decrease in emissions, regardless of greenhouse gas production in another part 
of the world—the utility of unilateral measures must be judged by the global 
level of greenhouse gases. The problem of carbon leakage here is crucial because 
if higher environmental regulation in one nation leads to increased production 
of carbon-heavy goods elsewhere, then the reductions in one nation may be 
offset or nullified completely by greenhouse gas production in other parts of the 
globe. If carbon leakage is high enough, unilateral national legislation may 
actually increase global levels of greenhouse gases, creating the possibility that 
inaction would be better than unilateral action. 
Nonetheless, a number of states have adopted, or are considering adopting, 
their own national-level greenhouse gas reduction programs. While advocates 
of the national-level programs acknowledge that these policies are an 
inadequate response to global warming, their support for national-level 
legislation is premised on the idea that the measures are a step forward toward 
the ultimate goal of a global agreement. But are these national measures really 
steps in the right direction? Surprisingly, this question has been largely ignored 
in climate change debates, even though it should be central to deciding the best 
national-level response to climate change. National-level legislation can create a 
demand for greater international action, but it can also preempt or frustrate 
such a demand. Consequently, the widely held view that national legislation is 
consistently a stepping stone to an international agreement may be overly 
optimistic. The crucial question, and the one that this Article explores, is how 
incremental national legislation affects the prospects for a global climate change 
agreement. 
The answer to this question depends on how national legislation alters 
domestic politics—in the regulating state and in other states—and shapes 
stakeholders’ interests in pursuing a comprehensive global solution. This Article 
identifies four dynamic political mechanisms that likely will be important in the 
climate change context and that might support the intuitive argument that 
national legislation is likely to be a stepping stone to a global agreement. These 
dynamic political effects may generate more support for a global solution, but 
they may also prove ineffective and, therefore, a waste of political resources. 
Worse, some of these dynamics might actually work in the opposite direction, 
reducing the odds of progress at the international level. 
The first mechanism involves directing resources to industries that support 
a climate change treaty. National climate change regulation might promote 
structural changes in the economy that will naturally result in greater political 
support for greater regulation. For instance, a domestic cap-and-trade system 
encourages greater reliance on cleaner energy supplies at home by raising the 
costs of domestic carbon emissions. This, in turn, spurs the development of a 
green energy sector that would support greater global environmental 
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regulation. But there can also be effects that push in the opposite direction: A 
domestic cap-and-trade system could also cause a relocation of carbon-heavy 
production to developing countries, where these industries would use their 
political influence to resist international efforts to place limits on greenhouse 
gas production. 
A second mechanism is aimed specifically at international negotiations. By 
passing domestic legislation, a government might signal its leadership on the 
climate change issue by demonstrating that it is committed to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. This signal might then encourage other states to do 
the same. National legislation, however, is a complicated signal. The national 
legislation not only signals cooperation but also the terms on which the state is 
willing to cooperate. Legislation with modest goals or very thin public support 
may signal that the state will not be able or willing to accept a deeper 
international commitment, making an international compromise harder to 
achieve. 
A third mechanism is to generate industry demand for a uniform global 
environmental standard. In this scenario, industries would support an 
international agreement to avoid conflicting national regulations that interfere 
with global commerce. For instance, California’s recent threat of state-level 
legislation that would impose stringent fuel efficiency standards led the 
automotive industry to accept federal fuel economy standards that were higher 
than under previous federal law but lower than the California standard. Shifting 
from the domestic regulatory context to the international regulatory system, 
however, it is far from obvious that a patchwork regime of differing national-
level climate change regimes would spur the development of a consistent set of 
international standards. Unlike federal legislation, which applies to all states 
regardless of their support for higher fuel economy standards, an international 
agreement requires the consent of each nation and cannot bind jurisdictions 
that do not wish voluntarily to change their environmental standards. A series 
of conflicting national regulatory standards may lead to the perverse result of 
making an international agreement more difficult to coordinate. 
A fourth mechanism consists of cultivating greater environmental norms in 
the general public. This process might work in several different ways. National 
legislation could increase public acceptance of environmental norms by slowly 
increasing environmental standards. It could also gradually increase popular 
political demands for lower greenhouse emissions. Finally, it could help to build 
coalitions between environmental groups and industry if, as is often suggested, 
the process of drafting and implementing national legislation is a positive 
experience that later makes participants willing to take stronger cooperative 
steps. But all of these possibilities are empirically contingent or dubious. 
Certainly the public has not always come to appreciate environmental 
regulation. If modest regulation leads to spikes in energy prices, the public may 
grow skeptical of environmental norms. Enacting legislation may lull popular 
demands for stronger measures if the public believes that the necessary action 
has already been taken. And alliances between environmental groups and 
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industry that can be forged to pass domestic legislation may not extend to 
stricter international legislation that creates newly divergent interests. 
The general lesson is that we should not conclude that all national climate 
change legislative proposals are worth substantial political investment. By no 
means is this an argument against all efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions at 
the national level. Instead, this Article should lead policymakers and academics 
to analyze more carefully the dynamic political impact of domestic proposals. 
By better understanding what aspects of national-level measures provide a basis 
for greater support for an international agreement—and what measures are 
likely to be pitfalls—we can make progress in identifying the kinds of measures 
that are genuinely worth pursuing. 
Toward this end, this Article proceeds to examine the key features of the 
Waxman-Markey Bill (which passed in the House on June 26, 2009) and the 
Lieberman-Warner Bill (the most advanced draft produced by the Senate). 
These two bills are representative of current legislative approaches to regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions, which together include most of the design elements 
likely to be on the table in national climate change policy debates in the United 
States and elsewhere. As it turns out, some of the design elements of these bills 
are likely to spur positive political dynamics, increasing the probability of an 
international agreement, while others are likely to be counterproductive. Still 
other measures in the legislation are difficult to assess theoretically, because 
they are likely to be constructive on some mechanisms (such as relocating 
economic resources) but counterproductive on others (such as building public 
support for greater regulation). The purpose of this Article is not to pass 
judgment on these two particular proposals but to develop a constructive 
framework of analysis that can also be used to evaluate new national legislative 
proposals, either in the United States or in other countries. 
At a higher level of theoretical abstraction, the Article also aspires to 
contribute to the international relations theory of “two-level” (domestic and 
international) games. Climate change is a good case study of how domestic 
legislation can have dynamic effects on a state’s international bargaining 
position. National legislation is not simply a static marker of how far a state is 
willing to compromise, as most international relations theory assumes. It is also 
a source of change in domestic preferences that define the set of achievable 
international agreements. In climate change and many other contexts, national 
legislation will affect domestic politics in ways that have significant 
consequences for subsequent international bargaining. 
This Article provides a framework for judging whether national legislation 
is a stepping stone or stumbling block to achieving a global agreement. Part I 
lays out the model of a two-level game with domestic and international 
bargaining concerning international public goods. It develops the core of the 
argument that there are several mechanisms by which domestic legislation can 
be a stepping stone or stumbling block to an international agreement and 
addresses each mechanism in the context of climate change. Parts II and III 
apply this framework to the issue of climate change. Part II reviews the public 
goods nature of global warming, the issue of carbon leakage, international 
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negotiations over climate change thus far, and the inability of either national 
legislation or uncoordinated cross-national action to solve the problem of 
global warming. Part III analyzes the provisions of the Waxman-Markey and 
Lieberman-Warner proposals. This Part demonstrates that some design features 
of the bills are beneficial while others are counterproductive. Part IV concludes 
by discussing the broader implications of this work. This Part discusses how 
domestic measures have influenced international negotiations for a multilateral 
agreement in other public goods contexts. Specifically, it examines the effect of 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), a unilateral measure designed 
to regulate international corruption, on treaty negotiations at the Organization 
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Part highlights how 
the analysis developed here is relevant to a much broader spectrum of global 
public goods. 
 
I. Mechanisms of Incrementalism 
 
This Part discusses the static and dynamic effects of national legislation on 
international negotiations for a climate change treaty regime. To do so, it uses 
the framework of a two-level game where politics on the domestic level 
determines the set of achievable international agreements on the international 
level. Section I.A sets out this two-level game framework. Section I.B analyzes 
four ways in which national legislation has the potential to create or to 
undermine greater domestic support for an international agreement. This 
Section provides the foundation for evaluating national legislative proposals.  
 
A. Evaluating Incremental Measures: Dynamic and Static Effects 
 
When a comprehensive policy measure is not politically feasible, are partial 
measures worthwhile?1 Are these measures building blocks or stumbling blocks 
to an international agreement? Valuing incremental measures involves a static 
analysis and a dynamic analysis. The static analysis asks what the immediate and 
direct effects of the policy are. For instance, if the United States adopts climate 
change legislation, what will be the country’s reduction in greenhouse gas 
 
1. Discussions of incrementalism fall along two axes. The first axis is whether there is 
learning from incremental measures that improves the later outcome. This 
question goes to the optimal means of selecting a measure: Is the best means to 
experiment as we go or to enact one comprehensive solution? Compare Robert E. 
Goodin, Political Theory and Public Policy (1982) (arguing against 
incrementalism), with Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 
19 Pub. Admin. Rev. 79 (1959) (arguing in favor of piecemeal decision-making 
because information is gained as policies are implemented). The second axis is 
whether a more comprehensive measure is politically feasible. This question asks 
whether the comprehensive program is something that realistically can be 
achieved. If the answer is “no,” then the question is whether some incremental 
measure is better: Should the perfect be the enemy of the good? This Article 
focuses on the second axis of incrementalism. 
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emissions? The dynamic analysis asks how the measure will affect the system. If 
the United States adopts climate change legislation, how will this affect 
greenhouse gas production around the globe?2 This view requires an analysis of 
the longer-term and indirect effects of the policy change, including how the 
policy alters incentives for private and public actors at home and abroad. The 
dynamic analysis also involves a time element: how the policy change shapes the 
cost and benefits of policy changes at the next decision point. A decision to 
establish a carbon tax is far more costly after a nation has instituted a cap-and-
trade system than it is when a nation is making the initial decision to adopt a 
cap-and-trade or carbon tax system. This dynamic analysis often goes under the 
title of path dependence, but there can be several different causal mechanisms 
at play (and often pushing in different directions).  
In national debates about climate change legislation, the dynamic analysis is 
more important than the static analysis to the issue of finding a comprehensive 
solution to the climate change crisis. Focusing on the direct effects of national 
legislation—that is, the national reductions in greenhouse gas emission 
expected from the legislation—is misleading. There are few serious claims that 
the measures taken by one nation (or even a few nations) in isolation can solve 
the climate change crisis. Focusing on the static level leads to debates about 
whether unilateral measures pass a cost-benefit analysis (which they almost 
never do because the atmosphere is a public good3) and does not address the 
real issue of whether these measures will galvanize efforts for a coordinated 
international response, which should be the primary goal of all climate change 
legislation.4 The focus on dynamic effects is additionally important because 
 
2. See Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Pierson, Increasing Returns] (exploring 
dynamic analysis as a new lens for reevaluating “path dependence”); see also 
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (1990); Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, 
and Social Analysis (2004) [hereinafter Pierson, Politics in Time]. 
3. An Economic View of the Environment, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ 
analysis/stavins/?p=206 (June 29, 2009, 12:28 EDT) [hereinafter Stavins, National 
Climate Change Policy]. Stavins acknowledges that national-level action does not 
pass a cost-benefit analysis that is focused on purely static, national-level effects: 
 The environmental benefits of any single nation’s reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions are spread worldwide, unlike the costs. This 
means that for any single country, the costs of action will inevitably 
exceed its direct benefits, despite the fact that the global costs of action 
will be less than global benefits. 
 Id. 
4. At least one debate on the value of national climate change measures focuses on 
the static analysis of federal legislation without considering dynamic effects. Eric 
Posner and Cass Sunstein argue that the U.S. decision to adopt emissions-
reducing measures unilaterally would not pass a cost-benefit analysis because such 
measures (taken in isolation) will have next to no effect on global climate change. 
See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Geo. L.J. 1565, 
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static effects and dynamic effects can move in opposite directions. National 
legislation can have negative static effects on greenhouse gas emissions (for 
instance, if carbon leakage exceeds 100%) but have positive dynamic effects if 
the legislation leads to comparable actions internationally. Similarly, national-
level measures that have beneficial static effects can have negative dynamic 
effects. A carbon tariff that decreases carbon leakage will help to decrease global 
emissions in the short term but will build resistance to an international 
agreement from industries that benefit from the protection afforded by the 
tariff. 
This dynamic analysis plays out in a two-level policy space. A two-level 
game is a framework from international relations theory that examines the 
relationship between policymaking on the domestic and international planes.5 
This framework has proven to be a productive vein for international law and 
international relations theorists to explore the effect of national politics on 
international negotiations and the reciprocal influence of international law on 
domestic policymaking.6 Robert Putnam developed the idea of a two-level game 
 
1600 (2008) (“[I]t is far from clear that the United States could have taken 
unilateral action that would have created benefits for the rest of the world greater 
than the cost to the United States.”). Jody Freeman and Andrew Guzman reply 
that the costs to the United States of climate change are so great that unilateral 
measures would pass a cost-benefit analysis regardless of the actions of other 
states. See Jody Freeman & Andrew T. Guzman, Seawalls Are Not Enough: Climate 
Change & U.S. Interests 62 (U.C. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1357690, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357690 (“Though international 
cooperation should be pursued, the reluctance of others to fully engage the 
problem is not a sound reason for inaction by the United States. Whatever others 
do, the United States should move aggressively to reduce global [greenhouse gas] 
emissions.”). 
5. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games, 42 Int’l Org. 427, 434 (1988) (offering two-level games as a framework for 
analyzing comparative politics and international relations); see also Kenneth W. 
Abbott, Enriching Rational Choice Institutionalism for the Study of International 
Law, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 5, 22-24 [hereinafter Abbott, Rational Choice 
Institutionalism] (discussing the application of two-level games to the study of 
international law); Kenneth Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A 
Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 Yale J. Int’l L. 335 (1989) [hereinafter 
Abbott, International Relations Theory] (discussing the application of 
international relations theory to international law more generally). 
6. For scholarship in international law, see Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age 
of Globalization, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 167 (1999); Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute 
Resolution in International Trade Law, 92 Va. L. Rev. 251 (2006); Ryan Goodman, 
Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 
531 (2002); Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 
Yale L.J. 1935 (2002); Laurence Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1579 (2005); 
George Norman & Joel Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 
Am. J. Int’l L. 541 (2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello & Stepan 
Wood, International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of 
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where national policymakers bargain over a policy issue in the international 
sphere as well as the domestic sphere.7 For example, the nation’s executive 
official may want to achieve a trade or environmental agreement with another 
nation or set of nations, but the legislature must be willing to ratify the 
agreement. Thus, to achieve an agreement, the executive must bargain on two 
planes simultaneously. She must secure an agreement that is acceptable to the 
representatives of the other states and to her own legislature. Bargaining at each 
level is not independent: What is achievable at the international level influences 
what the domestic legislature will accept, and the realities of domestic politics 
can affect the outcomes of international bargaining. 
Putnam’s analysis was groundbreaking because he demonstrated that a 
domestic constraint (here, the legislative ratification process) could be a 
bargaining advantage.8 If there is a range of agreements that all national 
governments can accept, then an international agreement that benefits all 
nations is achievable. The subsequent negotiations are distributional; they 
consist of selecting between differing treaty drafts. Each nation wants its 
preferred treaty draft to be adopted, but it would benefit from the adoption of 
any draft in the acceptable range. Putnam demonstrated that a government’s 
bargaining position is strengthened when it can credibly commit to accepting 
only its preferred treaty draft (or one that is very close). National legislation is 
the means by which a government can credibly commit. If the executive official 
has a domestic policy constraint, such as legislation that constrains what the 
executive can offer on the international level, then this constraint increases the 
bargaining power of the executive in the international system. 
Of course, a national-level constraint can also doom international 
negotiations. When the range of acceptable agreements is small, then a 
miscalculation at the national level can eliminate the “win set” entirely. For 
 
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 367 (1998); and Richard H. 
Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: 
Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 Am. J. Int’l L. 231 (1997). 
  For scholarship in political science, see Simon Hug & Thomas Konig, In View 
of Ratification: Government Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam 
Intergovernmental Conference, 56 Int’l Org. 447 (2002); Miles Kahler, The Causes 
and Consequences of Legalization, 54 Int’l Org. 661 (2000); Howard Lehman & 
Jennifer McCoy, The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 
Brazilian Debt Negotiations, 44 World Pol. 600 (1992); Sophie Meunier, What 
Single Voice? European Institutions and the EU-U.S. Trade Negotiations, 54 Int’l 
Org. 103 (2000); and Kal Raustiala, States, NGOs, and International 
Environmental Institutions, 41 Int’l Stud. Q. 719 (1997). 
7. Putnam, supra note 5, at 434. 
8. Abbott, Rational Choice Institutionalism, supra note 5, at 23; Andrew Moravscik, 
Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining, in 
Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic 
Politics 3, 4-5, 33 (Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam eds., 
1993). 
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instance, if the United States Congress, in its attempt to secure a high 
proportion of the joint gains of international cooperation, imposes a domestic 
constraint on the executive that puts the American position outside of the range 
of possible international outcomes, then treaty negotiations will collapse.9 
Similarly, the strategy will backfire if used by multiple governments. If two or 
more governments insist on their preferred treaty terms (and these demands are 
backed up by national legislation that binds the hands of the executive), then 
the win set of acceptable agreements will collapse and the mutually beneficial 
treaty regime will not come into force. 
This analysis makes use of the two-level game framework in examining 
global climate change negotiations. Understanding the relationship between 
national legislation and global climate change negotiations requires an analysis 
of each level. Domestic politics and international politics take place in different 
fora, but the two levels are not independent. The set of policies that are feasible 
on the international level is defined by domestic politics.10 International politics 
can also change the incentives of public and private actors and thus influence 
the domestic level.11 Particularly in the climate change issue area, international 
politics can have a powerful effect on domestic politics. A comprehensive 
solution to global warming is achievable only through international 
negotiations, and, therefore, a state’s willingness to undertake costly actions will 
depend, in part, on the credibility of the international commitments made by 
other states. 
The analysis here also extends conventional understandings of two-level 
games in a couple of ways. First, this analysis highlights that national legislation 
may be an opening bid, not a constraint, in international negotiations. 
Following on Putnam’s example, most uses of the two-level game framework 
view domestic legislation as a limit in international negotiations. National 
measures are enacted as a ceiling for what the state will accept in international 
bargaining. Yet domestic politics need not always be a constraint on 
international bargaining. Support for domestic legislation is based on the idea 
that the national measure will build international support.12 Second, and more 
importantly, this Article demonstrates the dynamic effects of national 
legislation on international bargaining. The two-level game framework 
 
9. See Keisuke Iida, When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?, 37 J. Conflict 
Resol. 403, 403-05 (1993); Putnam, supra note 5, at 433-41. This situation is similar 
to the battle of the sexes game. See infra Subsection I.B.2. 
10. See, e.g., Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical 
Analysis (1959) (describing the effect of domestic politics on international 
politics as the “second image”). 
11. See, e.g., Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of 
Domestic Politics, 32 Int’l Org. 881 (1978) (describing the effect of international 
politics on domestic politics as the “second image reversed”). 
12. See infra Section III.A (discussing how domestic legislation is viewed as a stepping 
stone towards an international agreement). 
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generally takes a static view of international negotiations. Domestic legislation is 
a marker of domestic preferences: National-level measures are a statement of 
how far a country is willing to compromise at any one point in time.13 Thus, 
legislation is a reflection, not a cause, of domestic preferences. This Article 
challenges this view by focusing on the dynamic effects of national legislation. 
National laws are more than a one-off picture of national policy preferences at a 
single point in time. As this analysis explores, national legislation can have a 
dynamic effect on domestic politics, setting a trajectory for the evolution of 
domestic policy preferences. 
This Article emphasizes that national-level measures are a cause of policy 
preference, both at home and abroad. Domestic legislation changes the political 
environment, shifting the interests of public interest groups and industries in 
supporting an international agreement. It can thus broaden the range of 
mutually acceptable agreements on the international plane as well as limit it. 
Domestic measures create economic and political incentives that, over time, 
redefine what policies governments need to coordinate as well as how best to 
coordinate. Conceptualizing national legislation as a cause of domestic political 
change also highlights the dangers of national legislation. If national legislation 
is evaluated only on its static effects, then we may overlook the longer-term 
impact of government action. This Article attempts to analyze the dynamic 
effects of national legislation by examining four causal mechanisms: the 
reallocation of economic resources, leadership in international negotiations, 
demands for uniform regulation, and evolving public norms regarding 
environmental preservation. The next Section discusses these mechanisms in 
detail.  
 
B. National Climate Change Legislation 
 
This project does not hope to provide a comprehensive answer to the 
question of whether incremental national measures are beneficial or 
counterproductive in all areas. Rather, it seeks to determine what types of 
national measures will have positive political dynamics and thus can build 
support for a climate change agreement. This project analyzes four mechanisms 
by which incremental legislation can build support for a comprehensive 
international agreement. All four can either lead to greater support for an 
international agreement or entrench resistance to it.  
 
1. Resource Allocation 
 
National-level measures can alter the dynamics of the policy process over 
time by directing resources towards groups that have an interest in advancing 
that policy. The idea here is that incremental measures will promote structural 
changes in the economy, which provide additional resources to constituencies 
that support a particular policy. In discussions of trade liberalization, for 
 
13. See Putnam, supra note 5, at 434. 
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example, more liberal trade policies are thought to create positive political 
feedback effects that encourage further trade liberalization. Lower tariff levels 
promote the economic interests of export-oriented industries and harm 
import-competing industries. Over time, export-oriented industries have more 
resources to lobby for additional liberalization while import-competing 
industries have less.14 Similar accounts can be found elsewhere.15 For instance, 
social security policies are often described as the third rail of politics because 
they direct resources to a constituency that aggressively defends and promotes 
these policies to continue the flow of resources to that constituency.  
Not all incremental measures towards an international goal, however, are 
beneficial. In the trade context, governments frequently engage in regional trade 
liberalization that provides lower barriers to trade to states in the regional 
agreement relative to states outside of the region. The question asked by many 
economists and political scientists is whether such regional measures are 
beneficial or detrimental to greater multilateral liberalization.16 Most 
economists consider global free trade to be the best policy option because it 
offers the greater economic gains. But when global free trade is not immediately 
attainable, are regional agreements for like-minded states that wish to adopt 
more aggressive free trade policies beneficial? In other words, are regional 
agreements a second-best option that advance efforts for global trade or will the 
regional agreement set states on a path that makes the greater multilateral trade 
harder to achieve?  
Empirical work by Daniel Kono indicates that the answer to this question 
depends on whether the regional agreements are trade-creating or trade-
diverting (directing resources to industries that are regionally competitive but 
not globally competitive).17 Trade-creating regimes provide greater material 
 
14. See Michael Gilligan, Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, 
and Collective Action in American Trade Policy (1997); North, supra note 
2; Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects 
Domestic Political Alignments (1989). 
15. The same is true of institutions. See Lucian Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of 
Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127 
(1999). 
16. See, e.g., Miles Kahler, International Institutions and the Political 
Economy of Integration (1995); Robert Z. Lawrence, Regionalism, 
Multilateralism and Deeper Integration (1996); Kenneth A. Oye, 
Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Political 
Economy in the 1930s and 1980s (1992); Jagdish Bhagwati, Departures from 
Multilateralism: Regionalism and Aggressive Unilateralism, 100 Econ. J. 1304, 1312 
(1990); Wilfred J. Ethier, Regionalism in a Multilateral World, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 
1214 (1998); Lawrence H. Summers, Regionalism and the World Trading System, in 
Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones: A Symposium 
Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 295 (1991), available 
at http://12.35.11.68/publicat/sympos/1991/S91summe.pdf. 
17. See Daniel Yuichi Kono, Are Free Trade Areas Good for Multilateralism? Evidence 
from the European Free Trade Association, 46 Int’l Stud. Q. 507 (2002); Daniel Y. 
Article - Rachel Brewster - 23 - Final - 2010.07.01 7/6/2010  9:31:53 AM 
STEPPING STONE OR STUMBLING BLOCK  
 257 
support to globally competitive industries, who will then lobby for greater 
multilateral trade agreements. Trade-diverting agreements, by contrast, direct 
resources toward industries that are regionally but not globally competitive and 
that will consequently oppose greater multilateral liberalization. When a 
regional agreement is trade-diverting, incremental trade liberalization puts 
states on a path to achieve a local maximum at the cost of a global maximum. 
Consequently, Kono argues that it is not the existence of a regional agreement 
but the membership and content of the agreement that produces the positive or 
negative political feedback effect. 
In the climate change debate, national legislation is thought to direct 
resources towards energy sources that produce lower levels of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system raises the cost of 
carbon emissions. The higher costs of emissions encourage the relocation of 
carbon production in the static analysis but should also encourage investment 
in carbon mitigation systems as well as sources of energy with lower emissions 
(and this investment should make mitigation and low-emissions energy sources 
cheaper).18 In the dynamic analysis, lowering the cost of emissions reductions 
makes a global agreement easier to achieve because it lowers the cost of climate 
change mitigation for everyone. The dynamic political effects can also be 
positive if American industry becomes one of the major providers of low 
emissions energy. Not only would national legislation direct more resources 
towards these industries, but the industries also would have an interest in 
lobbying for an international agreement that would raise the global demand for 
their product.19 Even if national-level measures lead to carbon leakage in the 
 
Kono, When Do Trade Blocs Block Trade?, 51 Int’l Stud. Q. 165 (2007). For the 
distinction between trade-creating and trade-diverting regimes, see Jacob Viner, 
The Customs Union Issue (1950). 
18. As Carol Browner, the Assistant to the President for Energy and Climate Change, 
recently argued: 
 During [the 1990 Clean Air Act] debate industry projected that the cost 
per ton of sulfur dioxide reductions would be over a thousand dollars. It 
turned out to be a fraction because American innovation and ingenuity 
rose to the occasion and we found solutions that allowed us to do it more 
cheaply once industry had that certainty.  
 Roundtable Interview by the Wall Street Journal with President Barack Obama, 
Energy Secretary Steven Chu, and Carol Browner, Assistant to the President for 
Energy and Climate Change, in Wash., D.C. (June 28, 2009) [hereinafter 
Roundtable Interview], available at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/06/28/ 
roundtable-interview-with-obama-on-climate-bill/. 
19. John M. Broder, White House Steps Up Climate Efforts, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 2009, 
at A19 (describing the White House claim that climate change legislation will help 
create a new green-energy industry). President Obama emphasized: 
 [A]s we transition into this clean energy economy we are going to see, I 
think, an enormous amount of economic activity and job production 
emerging. I know that the opponents of this bill kept on suggesting this 
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short term, the legislation can foster greater support for an international 
agreement within the United States and internationally by lowering the costs of 
compliance with that agreement. 
But this mechanism of resource allocation also can produce unintended 
negative political feedback effects. National legislation can lead carbon-
intensive producers to shift production to a lower-regulation nation. Although 
this shift has positive political effects for the passage of future climate change 
legislation in the United States by selection effects (polluters leave the 
jurisdiction and thus do not mobilize in national politics to oppose further 
regulation), it can lead to greater resistance among other nations to an 
international agreement. Industries that relocate to developing countries can 
lobby against an international agreement in those jurisdictions and may have 
greater political influence in developing states than in fully industrialized states. 
For instance, if carbon leakage from American steel producers leads to the 
expansion of the Chinese steel industry (due to either the relocation of 
American firms or the expansion of Chinese firms), then there is a growing base 
of manufacturers in China who may resist an international agreement that 
raises their costs. 
 
2. Leadership in International Negotiations 
 
Leadership in the international arena is a second mechanism that can lead 
to positive political feedback effects. This mechanism is explicitly aimed at the 
international audience. The idea here is that U.S. domestic action is not a 
solution to the climate change problem but demonstrates to the international 
community that the United States is willing to undertake costly action to 
address the global warming crisis. Robert Stavins, head of Harvard’s Belfer 
Center on Climate Change, maintains that “the credibility of the U.S. as a 
participant, let alone as a leader, in shaping the international regime is 
dependent upon our demonstrated willingness to take actions at home.”20  
The idea that unilateral action leads to international leadership can be 
analyzed through the lens of signaling theory.21 Domestic legislation is a signal 
 
was a jobs-killer, but everybody I talk to, when we think about how are 
we going to drive this economy forward post-bubble, keep on pointing to 
the opportunities for us to transition to a clean energy economy as a 
driver of economic growth. 
 Roundtable Interview, supra note 18. 
20. Stavins, National Climate Change Policy, supra note 3. 
21. Signaling theory is commonly used to explain international law and international 
relations. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of 
International Law (2005); Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law 
Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2008); Tom Ginsburg & Richard 
McAdams, Adjudication in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute 
Resolution, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1229 (2004); Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, A 
Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1999); Oona A. 
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to the international community that the United States is looking to engage 
other states in treaty negotiations regarding global warming. Because the United 
States is taking action without the agreement of other states, this legislation is 
arguably a credible signal of an American willingness to compromise on climate 
change issues.22 The signal is intended to make an international agreement 
easier to achieve. Other states observe the signal, are more likely to find it 
credible because it is costly, and then adjust their postures toward international 
negotiations accordingly. This unselfishness on the part of the United States 
raises the possibility that other states will act similarly. Domestic action is not a 
necessary precondition to an international agreement, but it is supposed to ease 
the negotiation process. 
An agreement over climate change is different than other international 
cooperative ventures in that it is largely a distributional game, not one of 
assurance. It almost goes without saying that nations prefer to adopt a set of 
policies that would solve the climate change problem. The issue is how much 
each state is willing to pay to do so. Because the major issue in achieving a global 
climate change mitigation treaty is distribution, leadership is demonstrated by a 
willingness to undertake a significant commitment.23 In this context, the signal 
the United States is sending through domestic legislation is not so much a signal 
of cooperation but a signal of how much it is willing to contribute. 
To see the difference, compare two different games that international 
relations theorists often use to describe interactions in international 
negotiations: the stag hunt and the battle of the sexes.24 These games are 
obviously a simplification of the negotiation process, but they are useful 
because they demonstrate the strategic dynamics at work.25 
The stag hunt game is one of assurance; the states consider collective action 
to solve a problem but are unsure of whether other states have an interest in 
pursuing collective action.26 The story behind the stag hunt game is that there 
 
Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International 
Law, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469 (2005); Kal Rastiala, Form and Substance in 
International Agreements, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 581 (2005). 
22. See Stavins, National Climate Change Policy, supra note 3. 
23. See Peter Baker, Poor Nations Reject a Target on Emissions Cuts, N.Y. Times, July 8, 
2009, at A1 (discussing the longstanding divide between developed and developing 
economies concerning who should bear the costs of mitigating the effects of 
climate change). 
24. See Richard McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Coordination, Game 
Theory, and the Law, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 209 (2009). 
25. See id. 
26. See Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 World Pol. 167 
(1978); Lisa Martin, Interest, Power, and Multilateralism, 46 Int’l Org. 765, 781 
(1992). 
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are two hunters who have to decide whether to hunt a stag or rabbits.27 To hunt 
a stag successfully, both hunters have to commit to the enterprise. Both hunters 
eat well if they both hunt stag (giving them each a payoff of 4). A hunter acting 
alone cannot bring down a deer, and, if he tries when the other hunter does not, 
then he will not eat (giving him a payoff of 0). If the hunter is acting alone, then 
the only prey that he can catch is rabbits (giving him a payoff of 2). The hunter 
is eating but not as well as he would with his share of the stag. The hunter 
prefers to hunt a stag (this provides the highest payoff) but will only engage in a 
stag hunt if he is assured that the other party will also hunt stag. Here, a signal 
of cooperation influences the other party’s actions because it provides the 
necessary assurance.28 The state will cooperate if it believes that other states will 
cooperate as well; distribution issues do not exist. A signal of cooperation will 
alter the beliefs of the observing states and thereby influence those states’ 
actions. 
 
Table 1: The Stag Hunt Game (Assurance) 
(Hunter 1, Hunter 2) Hunt Stag Hunt Rabbit 
Hunt Stag 4, 4 0, 2 
Hunt Rabbit 2, 0 2, 2 
 
In a battle of the sexes game, the parties again wish to coordinate their 
actions, but there is a distributional conflict. The game is based on a gender 
stereotype.29 A couple has to decide how to spend their night on the town. They 
both want to be together above all but have different preferences on what 
activity to attend. The man wants to attend the boxing match, and the woman 
wants to attend the ballet. Each person gets a payoff of 2 if they spend the 
evening together, and the person whose preferred activity is chosen receives an 
additional payoff of 1. So the woman has a payoff of 3 when the couple attends 
the ballet, while the man receives a payoff of 2. If the couple attends the boxing 
match, the man receives a payoff of 3, while the woman receives 2. Once one 
party can credibly commit to a position—say, buying season tickets to the 
ballet—then the other party is better off accepting the other’s choice but does 
not realize the same utility. Here, assuring cooperation is only part of the 
problem, the other part being the decision of how to distribute the costs or 
 
27. Douglas Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and 
the Law 41-42 (1998); James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political 
Scientists (1994). 
28. McAdams, supra note 24, at 220-21. 
29. See Morrow, supra note 27, at 91-92. Morrow suggests a politically correct name 
for the game: the “Contest of the Individuals with Neither Gender nor Sexual 
Orientation Specified.” Id. In the game, Pat and Chris have different preferences 
for spending their vacation at the beach or the mountains. 
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benefits of coordination.30 Consequently, the content of the statement—the 
distributional allocation offered—is as important as the signal that cooperation 
is desired.31 
 
Table 2: The Battle of the Sexes (Distribution) 
(Woman, Man) Ballet Boxing Match 
Ballet  3, 2 1, 1 
Boxing Match 0, 0 2, 3 
 
Global negotiations over climate change include elements of both the stag 
hunt game and the battle of the sexes.32 States look for evidence that other 
members of the international community are willing to take action in 
addressing climate change. Cooperation in climate change is not a dichotomous 
choice. The relevant question is not whether states are willing to act but how 
much they are willing to do. Any signal sent by the United States (or another 
state) is a double communication: whether the state will cooperate and on what 
terms. In the climate change arena, the second signal is as important as the first. 
Although leadership is often cited as a reason for passing domestic 
legislation, popular discussions of leadership in climate change negotiations 
rarely define what leadership is. Unless all domestic action would qualify as 
leadership, popular discussions do not give content to the idea of leadership in 
the provision of a global public good. Certainly the unilateral provision of the 
good would qualify as leadership. Where international coordination is 
necessary to provide a global public good, however, leadership has to include 
other elements, such as bearing a disproportionately large share of the burden 
of providing the good or prodding other states to adopt changes. In a stag hunt 
game, the passage of climate change legislation before international 
negotiations could be sufficient to assure the other parties that the state wants 
to cooperate. This signal might then be leadership if the signaling party were a 
significant enough player to establish cooperation as the dominant strategy. Yet, 
in a battle of the sexes game, climate change legislation could be a signal of the 
state’s approach on how costs for the good should be distributed. A leadership 
signal in this situation would be that the state is willing to bear more than its 
 
30. See Stephen Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the 
Pareto Frontier, 43 World Pol. 336, 339 (1991); see also Martin, supra note 26, at 
775. 
31. See Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 Harv. Int’l L.J. 231, 246 
(2009) (discussing how, in coordination situations, treaty negotiators can have 
mixed motives between wanting to form an agreement and wanting an agreement 
that provides them with the largest share of the gains). 
32. At least two authors have described international climate change negotiations in 
terms of the stag hunt game. See Alfred Endres & Cornelia Ohl, Introducing 
“Cooperative Push”: How Inefficient Environmental Policy (Sometimes!) Protects the 
Global Commons Better, 111 Pub. Choice 285, 287-89 (2002). 
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share of the cost to achieve a coordinated outcome. In terms of the battle of the 
sexes games, this would be the man’s accepting a night at the ballet (or the 
woman’s accepting a night at the boxing match) to ensure that coordination is 
achieved. If the signal is that the state is willing to coordinate but only on its 
own terms, i.e., the man insisting on the boxing match or the woman insisting 
on the ballet, then coordination may be possible but it is not made any easier. 
Such action would not constitute leadership.  
Accordingly, domestic legislation may send a complex message to the 
international community. The passage of domestic limits on carbon emissions 
may place the United States on the moral high ground—committing to lower 
emissions even without a reciprocal promise by other states to do so. This move 
may convince other states that cooperation on climate change is a realistic goal 
and thereby increase those states’ willingness to compromise as well. 
The domestic legislation also can signal the state’s approach to distribution. 
The signal is not only whether the state wants to cooperate but on what terms 
the state will cooperate. Thus, ambitious domestic action may be a signal of 
leadership where more modest domestic commitments may signal an aversion 
to shouldering a significant share of the costs. A state’s domestic legislation is 
not the ceiling for what the government can commit to in international 
negotiations. States can act domestically first and then commit to great cuts as 
part of an international treaty negotiation. Yet, as a signal of the state’s likely 
negotiating strategy, the state’s domestic legislation can be a positive or a 
negative signal of its willingness to sign on to a treaty, let alone take a leadership 
role. For instance, the Japanese government pledged in June 2009 to decrease its 
emissions to 92% of 1990 levels (which is 85% of 2005 levels) by 2020.33 Although 
this statement was designed to establish Japanese international leadership on 
climate change issues, environmental groups decried the statement as 
insufficiently ambitious.34 Similarly, the European Union has expressed its 
frustration with the lack of ambition in American proposals to decrease 
domestic emissions to 97% of the 2005 level by 2012.35 Certainly, passing any 
domestic legislation is a better signal than not passing any domestic legislation, 
but not all legislative proposals will signal leadership. 
 
 
 
 
33. John Murphy, Japan Pledges To Cut Emissions by 15%, Wall St. J., June 11, 2009, 
at A7. 
34. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Sets Emissions Targets, and No One Seems Pleased, N.Y. 
Times, June 11, 2009, at A8; Posting of James Kanter to Green, 
http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/tsunami-of-criticism-for-japans-
co2-goals/ (June 10, 2009, 12:02 EDT). 
35. James M. Broder & James Kanter, Despite Shift on Climate by U.S., Europe Is Wary, 
N.Y. Times, July 8, 2009, at A9 (reporting on Europe’s pleasure with the Obama 
Administration’s seriousness regarding climate change but displeasure with 
American short-term goals to reduce emissions). 
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3. Demands for a Uniform Standard 
 
The third mechanism by which an incremental measure can generate a 
positive political dynamic to support further measures is by creating an 
industry demand for a uniform regulatory standard.36 Differing national, state, 
or municipal standards can create a patchwork of environmental regulations 
that raises the costs of doing business for key industry groups. This effect is 
visible in the recent federally coordinated compromise on automotive fuel 
efficiency standards.37 California threatened to enact legislation that would raise 
the required fuel economy standards and applied to receive a waiver from the 
Environmental Protection Agency to do so.38 Ten other states and the District 
of Columbia had pledged to follow California’s lead if a waiver was granted. 
The possibility of having two different fuel efficiency standards together with 
greater political pressure to reduce emissions levels led the automobile industry 
to agree to raise fuel efficiency over the next four years. 
Using state-level measures to achieve more comprehensive federal 
measures, particularly in the environmental area, is not new to politics in the 
United States. According to Donald Elliott, Bruce Ackerman, and John Millian, 
the Air Quality Act of 1967 was the result of state-level measures that 
encouraged industry to seek a comprehensive national solution.39 
Environmental activists lobbied for high environmental standards at the state 
 
36. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The 
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1500-16 (2007) (explicitly 
discussing this causal mechanism as a means to spur federal legislation on climate 
change in the United States); see also Cinnamon Carlarne, Notes from a Climate 
Change Pressure-Cooker: Sub-Federal Attempts at Transformation Meet National 
Resistance in the USA, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1351, 1355-60 (2008). 
37. Remarks on Fuel Efficiency Standards, 2009 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 200900377 
(May 19, 2009); John M. Broder & Micheline Maynard, As Political Winds Shift, 
Detroit Charts New Course, N.Y. Times, May 20, 2009, at A22; Henry J. Pullizi, 
Obama Says New Car-Fuel Rules Give Industry ‘Certainty,’ Wall St. J., May 20, 
2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124275189316335291.html; 
Elizabeth Shogren, Obama To Announce Auto Pollution Plan, National Public 
Radio, May 19, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId 
=104287140. 
38. The EPA granted the waiver on June 30, 2009. By that time, California already had 
agreed not to raise standards until 2017 as part of the federally coordinated 
compromise. See Jim Tankersley, California Wins EPA Waiver on Greenhouse 
Emissions, L.A. Times, June 30, 2009, at A6. 
39. E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of 
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 
313, 326-33 (1985); see also Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean 
Coal/Dirty Air (1981). Where there is federal preemption of state law, federal 
law may actually weaken environmental requirements. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 429 (2002). 
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level, particularly in states where strong industrial lobbies did not exist. The 
resulting patchwork of state-level measures, which required different product 
standards, was a burden to industry groups, who wished to sell their products 
nationwide. This approach led industry groups to push for national-level 
environmental legislation. The federal statute incorporated higher levels of 
environmental protection than the industry groups would otherwise have 
selected but established a uniform set of standards. 
Applying this mechanism to climate change (and thus to the international 
arena), however, is far more complicated. This mechanism can work at the 
international level, but it requires greater consensus than at the domestic level. 
Unlike federal legislation, which can generally preempt state action regardless of 
the state’s support for higher or lower fuel economy or air quality standards, an 
international agreement only binds states that choose to join the agreement.40 
Where domestic legislators can bind dissenting groups within a state to a policy 
that has the necessary level of legislation support (the minority acquiescence 
principle), there is no such principle at the international level. For instance, if 
Michigan was opposed to the 1967 Air Quality Act, it could not refuse the 
legislation once there was sufficient congressional support for the measure. By 
contrast, developing states (such as China and India) can refuse to join an 
international agreement even if a majority of states in the international system 
sign and ratify the agreement.  
Creating a patchwork of national-level measures has the possibility of 
generating demand for an international agreement that would apply a uniform 
emissions standard. A strategy of diffuse national incrementalism on 
greenhouse gas emissions policy could make international trade sufficiently 
difficult for enough industry groups to establish good conditions for 
international negotiations. But this is a risky strategy that could backfire. 
Creating such difficult conditions for international trade could have short-term 
negative economic results that would make it harder for governments to 
commit to costly environmental policy.41 In addition, differing national 
standards might make an international agreement more difficult by committing 
states to different environmental standards.42 Instead of leading to a single 
international standard, differing national legislation may harden bargaining 
 
40. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 36, at 1500-16. 
41. The national regulatory patchwork may provide de facto trade protection to many 
domestic groups and thus be surprisingly difficult to remove. 
42. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate 
Policies, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, 1974 (2007) (discussing the dangers of adopting 
state-level measures to spur federal action on climate change but noting that 
national-level standards could also complicate international bargaining on a 
climate agreement). This danger also exists for state-level environmental measures 
where federal legislation does not emerge to unify standards. See Cary Coglianese 
& Jocelyn D’Ambrosio, Policymaking Under Pressure: The Perils of Incremental 
Responses to Climate Change, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1411, 1424-25 (2008) (arguing 
against the utility of state-level measures). 
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positions and narrow (if not eliminate) the win set of possible international 
agreements that are acceptable to a critical mass of states.43 
 
4. Cultivating Public Opinion 
 
The fourth mechanism addresses aspects of learning as well as the 
development and acceptance of environmental norms. There are several aspects 
of this mechanism, which are often lumped together but need to be treated 
separately. First, the idea of cultivating public opinion frequently refers to the 
education of the public about the hazards of rising greenhouse gas levels.44 In 
the process of lobbying for environmental regulations, interest groups educate 
the public on benefits of the regulation and set the stage for greater appreciation 
and concern for the environment among the public. With greater awareness of 
the dangers of climate change comes the acceptance of environmental norms as 
well as greater popular political demands for national and international action 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.45  
Cultivating public opinion also includes the idea that the public will 
develop a preference for progressively higher levels of environmental regulation 
once some initial regulation is put in place.46 This taste for high levels of 
regulation develops as the public learns that the costs of such regulation are 
modest and observes the environmental gains from the regulation.47 Here, 
 
43. See James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52 
Int’l Org. 269, 280-93 (1998); Putnam, supra note 5; see also Iida, supra note 9; 
Jongryn Mo, The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions, 
38 J. Conflict Resol. 402 (1994). 
44. See David G. Victor, Climate Change: Debating America’s Policy Options 
64-67 (2004) (discussing the importance of educating the public on climate issues 
and describing public opinion on climate change as “highly malleable”). 
45. See Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and 
Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 555, 556 (2004) (arguing 
for cultural change towards great environmental norms, rather than a cost-benefit 
analysis, when setting goals of climate change mitigation). 
46. The Waxman-Markey Bill: A Good Start or a Non-Starter?, Yale Env’t 360, June 
18, 2009, http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2163 [hereinafter A Good 
Start] (statement of Angela Anderson, Program Director for the U.S. Climate 
Action Network) (“The U.S. tradition on environmental protection seems to 
dictate that the most difficult step is the first one. Whether it is clean water, clean 
air, or ozone depletion, we have never been able to pass a bill and walk away. We 
set the policy in place, fight for swift and stringent implementation, sue when we 
need to, and go back to Congress if we haven’t gotten it right.”). 
47. Cf. Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization 
of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 85 (2001) (describing the 
conventional view that environmental legislation will reliably lead to greater 
public demands for environmental protection and then challenging this view). 
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national regulation is seen as the priming agent for the public acceptance of 
greater levels of future national and international regulation.  
Finally, this mechanism includes the process of constructing coalitions 
between environmental groups and industry. National-level legislation often 
requires an industry-environment alliance (the so-called Blue Green Alliance48). 
The process of drafting and implementing national legislation requires 
environmental and industry groups to learn about the other’s concerns and 
compromise. Coalition-building can be a positive experience that outlasts the 
initial legislative goal, developing trust between antagonists and making 
participants willing to take further steps together. 
Not all of these arguments should lead us to embrace national legislation. 
Educating the public regarding the dangers of climate change is a positive 
action. If the public underestimates either the probability or the extent of 
climate change harms, then educating both the general public and industry is an 
uncomplicated benefit to better policymaking. If there is a danger to this 
mechanism, however, it is linking the dangerous effects of climate change to the 
idea that national legislation will address the problem. As Cary Coglianese and 
Jocelyn D’Ambrosio argue with regard to the influence of state regulation on 
the popular demand for federal regulation, noncomprehensive measures can 
lull the public into believing that meaningful legislation has been passed and 
thus dampen the demand for further action.49 The passage of a national climate 
change bill, in isolation, will not solve the problem of climate change, but the 
public may believe either that the necessary action has been taken or that the 
public has done its share to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In the United 
States, for example, citizens may feel that their state has taken an important step 
and now it is up to others (perhaps China) to continue the progress. Therefore, 
rather than energizing the public to demand greater action, national-level 
legislation can be a stumbling block to an international agreement, leading to 
public complacency about climate change. 
In addition, the public’s experience with national climate change regulation 
may not be positive. In the context of American legislation, the costs of 
greenhouse gas regulation are still unknown. High energy costs could erode 
public support for environmental regulation. The benefits of climate change 
mitigation may also be difficult for the public to observe. Unlike with clean air 
or water legislation, there are no local climate change benefits to reducing 
greenhouse gases for voters to observe. In the news media, the public is likely to 
 
48. The Sierra Club and the United Steelworkers have created the Blue Green 
Alliance. See Steven Greenhouse, Millions of Jobs of a Different Collar, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 26, 2008, at SPG1. 
49. Coglianese & D’Ambrosio, supra note 42, at 1425 (“[I]ncremental policies may lull 
the public into thinking climate change is being addressed, thus dampening 
demand for the costly and comprehensive policies that will achieve the most 
meaningful results. In the wake of a proliferation of incremental policies, 
comprehensive solutions must garner additional support in order to overcome 
bias toward the status quo.”). 
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still hear that the dangers of climate change are imminent, both because of 
carbon leakage and because the current legislative proposals will produce few 
short-term benefits (even if carbon leakage is zero). These factors, alone or in 
combination, could push public opinion in unexpected directions, making the 
public enthusiastic for, or cynical about, future regulation. It could lead to 
greater demand for greenhouse gas limitations. Alternatively, it could make the 
public skeptical about the benefits of further regulation.50 
Lastly, political coalitions between industry and environmental groups for 
national-level legislation may prove fleeting. Industry groups may support an 
international agreement on climate change, particularly if the industry has 
green energy supplies or low-energy production processes to export. But some 
industries’ support may stop at the water’s edge. If industry groups supported 
national legislation for protectionist benefits (such as a carbon tariff) or to 
avoid stricter international regulation, then these alliances may be quite fragile. 
For instance, a domestic cap-and-trade system that provides carbon-heavy 
producers with free carbon permits could entrench resistance to an 
international agreement that would not similarly provide free permits. Support 
for the domestic-level measure by industry can be a strategic move to establish a 
level of national regulation that satisfies public demands to take action on 
climate change but avoids more stringent global regulation. Environmental 
groups may overinvest political capital in national legislation and industry 
alliances. If the ultimate goal is to secure an international agreement, 
environmental groups may not be able to rely on the industry relationships that 
they cultivated for national-level regulations, as such support may erode as 
regulatory costs increase. 
In the end, some incremental measures may move us closer to a solution 
for climate change, while other measures may make the path to an international 
agreement more difficult.51 The crucial question is how these incremental 
measures influence domestic support (at home and abroad) for an international 
agreement. Although there may be a natural feeling that something must be 
done about the problem of climate change, not all national-level measures will 
produce dynamic benefits. To be clear, this is not to say that the United States 
should not pass climate change legislation. The dangers of global warming are 
real, and the United States needs to be part of the global solution. The nation’s 
goal must be to pass legislation that produces positive dynamic effects. 
Adopting legislation with negative dynamic effects can be worse than doing 
nothing at all. This project seeks to provide a framework for analyzing the 
 
50. Id. (“[T]he failures of incremental climate change policies might breed increased 
cynicism about whether any policy solution can work. When small commitments 
fail to produce large policy pay-offs, policies can become harder, not easier, to 
expand.”). 
51. For opposing viewpoints on incremental measures, see Freeman & Guzman, supra 
note 4 (arguing in favor of U.S. unilateral action even without action by other 
states); and Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1600-01 (noting the minimal or 
zero effect of U.S. unilateral action). 
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positive and negative feedback effects of national-level measures. By better 
understanding what measures provide a basis for greater support for an 
international agreement, and what measures are likely to be pitfalls, we can 
better analyze which legislative proposals are worth pursuing. 
 
II. National Regulatory Efforts 
 
This Part argues that national climate change legislation cannot provide a 
solution to the problem of climate change in the absence of an international 
agreement. It explains why this is true of both national action in isolation and a 
series of uncoordinated national actions undertaken by multiple states. Section 
II.A discusses the global nature of climate change as well as how carbon leakage 
undermines national regulation. Section II.B explains how uncoordinated 
action by many states is also highly unlikely to produce sustainable levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions. States have vastly different views of what a fair 
division of greenhouse gas emissions between nations would be. A series of 
uncoordinated national measures is better than nothing (so long as levels of 
carbon leakage are sufficiently low), but these uncoordinated actions cannot be 
expected to achieve a sustainable level of global emissions. Even with national 
legislation, an effective solution to the problem of climate change requires an 
international agreement. Thus, if the ultimate goal is to provide the public good 
of mitigating global warming, the critical issue for evaluating the usefulness of 
national regulation is its ability to aid international negotiations. 
 
A. National Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 
The planet’s atmosphere is a public good, and climate change constitutes a 
public bad.52 Climate change is “public” in that it works on a global scale.53 
There is only one atmosphere, which all nations share. Greenhouse gases 
produced anywhere on the globe circulate throughout the world.54 Even though 
 
52. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1244-45 
(1968); see also David Archer, Global Warming: Understanding the 
Forecast 169-72 (2007) (discussing how global warming is a tragedy of the 
commons on a global scale); William D. Nordhaus & Joseph Boyer, Warming 
the World: Economic Models of Global Warming 3 (2000) (same); Joseph 
E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work 162-66 (2006) (same). 
53. See Paul G. Harris, Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime 
Failure, 47 Nat. Resources J. 195 (2007) (applying Mancur Olson’s theory of 
collective action to climate change); John K. Setear, Learning To Live with Losing: 
International Environmental Law in the New Millennium, 20 Va. Envtl. L.J. 139 
(2001) (discussing the complexities of global public goods and the difficulty of 
reaching an international agreement). 
54. See Richard T. Wright, Environmental Science: Toward a Sustainable 
Future 546-47 (9th ed. 2005) (explaining the greenhouse gas effect and the fact 
that climate depends on the Earth’s overall concentration of greenhouse gases). 
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climate change will have varying effects on different parts of the world,55 all 
nations will be affected by climate change regardless of whether they have 
produced greenhouse gases or not.56 As China’s lead climate negotiator, Yu 
Qingtai, stated: “Not a single country in the world will be able to stay out of 
trouble. . . . Not a single country can say that it can keep safe and intact from 
global warming.”57 
Because the world’s atmosphere is a global commons, the benefits of 
climate change mitigation efforts undertaken by one state are not reaped 
locally.58 The benefits of that state’s efforts are available to all users of the 
planet’s atmosphere, regardless of whether those users are contributing to the 
mitigation efforts.59 That state also cannot enclose the commons and thus 
exclude others from profiting from the state’s investment. Greenhouse gases 
circulate freely throughout the globe, so any decrease in greenhouse gases made 
in one location cannot be captured as a climate benefit to that location.60  
Consequently, the political process for dealing with global greenhouse gas 
pollution is very different from that for dealing with local pollution. Citizens of 
the territory producing the greenhouse gases do not internalize fully the costs of 
the pollution that they are producing because the harms of greenhouse gas 
pollution are partly borne outside of the polluting jurisdiction. In addition, the 
national government will not fully internalize the benefits of greenhouse gas 
mitigation efforts, because only part of the mitigation’s benefits will be reaped 
within the jurisdiction. If the public demands regulation such that the costs of 
greenhouse gas reduction are equal to the benefits, then the demand for 
unilateral greenhouse gas reduction will be too low to support sufficiently 
robust regulations.61 
 
55. See Nordhaus & Boyer, supra note 52, at 82 (discussing the disparate health 
impacts of global warming). 
56. For a map illustrating the worldwide impact of climate change on physical and 
biological systems and surface temperatures, see Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 32 fig.1.2 (2007) 
[hereinafter IPCC Report], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. 
57. See Michael Wines, China Sees Progress on Climate Accord, but Resists an Emissions 
Ceiling, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2009, at A8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
58. See Archer, supra note 52, at 169-72. 
59. See Stiglitz, supra note 52, at 162-66. 
60. Roberta Mann, Waiting To Exhale?: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 1135, 1144-45 (2002) (discussing global warming as a tragedy of the 
commons); Frederick A.B. Meyerson, Population, Development and Global 
Warming: Averting the Tragedy of the Climate Commons, 19 Population & Env’t 
443 (1998); Hugh Ward, Game Theory and the Politics of the Global Commons, 37 J. 
Conflict Resol. 203 (1993) (discussing global warming as a tragedy of the 
commons where collective action is blocked by national interests). 
61. Stavins, National Climate Change Policy, supra note 3. 
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National-level efforts are undermined further by carbon leakage.62 When 
one jurisdiction imposes environmental regulations on its local producers, the 
effect is one of raising production costs in that jurisdiction and causing more 
production to occur in jurisdictions with lower regulation.63 As a result of 
carbon leakage—the migration of greenhouse-gas-heavy production processes 
to low-regulation jurisdictions—the ultimate global effect of local measures 
cannot be judged only on the level of reduction of greenhouse gas production 
in the local jurisdiction. Rather, it must include an analysis of whether the local 
measure increases or decreases worldwide greenhouse gas emissions.64 The 
possibility of carbon leakage has led Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein to suggest 
that unilateral reduction of greenhouse gases by the United States would have 
“little effect on overall climate change.”65 
Leakage can occur in two ways.66 First, and most obviously, factories can 
relocate to the low-regulation state.67 The decision of the firm here is economic, 
taking into account the cost differences between producing in a high-regulation 
state versus a low-regulation state. Second, even without plant relocation, 
carbon leakage can occur through pricing.68 If a jurisdiction imposes 
environmental regulation, the regulation will raise the price of the good, and 
the demand for the local good will decrease. Producers of the same good in 
jurisdictions with low environmental regulation can expand their production 
and increase their exports of the lower-cost good abroad.69 Such would be the 
case with the production of American and Chinese steel. If the United States 
imposes environmental regulations on the American steel companies, which 
raises the cost of steel production, then demand for American steel at home and 
abroad will decrease. If China does not also impose higher environmental 
standards, then Chinese steel companies can expand their production of steel 
domestically and then export more steel abroad. As a result, the level of carbon-
 
62. Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon 
Leakage, 65 J. Int’l Econ. 421 (2004); Sean T. Fox, Responding to Climate Change: 
The Case for Unilateral Trade Measures To Protect the Global Atmosphere, 84 Geo. 
L.J. 2499 (1996); Jonathan B. Wiener, Property and Prices To Protect the Planet, 19 
Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 515 (2009). 
63. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in 
Legal Context, 108 Yale L.J. 677, 692-93 (1999). 
64. Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, Reconstructing Climate 
Policy: Beyond Kyoto 83-94 (2003). 
65. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1600-01 (2008). 
66. Wiener, supra note 42, at 1967-73; see also Trevor Houser et al., Leveling the 
Carbon Playing Field: International Compensation and US Climate 
Policy Design 2-10 (2008). 
67. Wiener, supra note 42, at 1967-68. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
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intensive production processes can increase in low-regulation states even 
without factory relocation.70 
Carbon leakage is important to any analysis of national climate change 
measures because lower greenhouse gas emissions may lead to increased 
greenhouse gas emissions in another jurisdiction.71 The extent of the leakage is 
an empirical question, but we know what the relevant factors are for answering 
this question.72 One would need to consider the percentage of the carbon-
intensive production that will move to a different jurisdiction (through either 
factory relocation or the price effect) and whether production in the low-
regulation state is dirtier, cleaner, or the same as in the first one.73 It is possible 
that local environmental measures will result in globally lower greenhouse gas 
emissions, higher emissions, or no difference whatsoever.74 In the absence of a 
comprehensive international agreement, the actions of one nation to decrease 
its greenhouse gases will not necessarily result in lower worldwide levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
National-level measures are appealing because governments can implement 
these measures without an international consensus on how to construct a 
comprehensive solution.75 If each state determines what its fair share of global 
greenhouse emissions should be, however, levels of greenhouse gases will be far 
above sustainable levels. This is not because of the bad intentions of any one 
state (or group of states) but because of different conceptions of what each 
state’s fair share of global emissions is. While uncoordinated national-level 
measures might slow the rate of greenhouse gas emissions below what the rate 
would be with no national-level legislation at all, states tend to view their 
current rates of emissions (and even increased rates of emissions) as their fair 
share of global carbon emissions. As a consequence, national measures can only 
be interim steps to a global climate change solution. 
 
 
 
 
 
70. Id. 
71. Wiener, supra note 63, at 692-93. 
72. Houser et al., supra note 66, at 2-10. 
73. Id. 
74. Babiker, supra note 62, at 441-43. 
75. This is not to say that states (or the citizens within states) do not or should not 
have some moral obligation to undertake greenhouse gas reductions on a national 
level. What is morally required depends on one’s moral philosophy. The 
argument here is that as a consequential matter, national regulation is not an 
effective means to ensure a globally sustainable level of greenhouse gas emissions. 
This argument has implications for moral requirements, though, if morality 
requires us to be concerned with the direct and indirect effects of our actions. 
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B. The Ineffectiveness of Uncoordinated National Policies 
 
The difficulties in regulating greenhouse gases through national legislation 
remain even if many states decide to adopt domestic measures to curb 
greenhouse gas emissions. There is broad agreement among governments that 
climate change is happening and that it will lead to extreme environmental and 
economic results.76 Yet there is no agreement on what criteria should inform 
the regulation of the planet’s atmosphere going forward.77 For example, should 
a state’s past contribution to the current stock of greenhouse gases factor into 
the analysis? What about a state’s level of development or population? 
Governments appear willing to bear a proportionate cost of solving the 
problem,78 but what is a proportionate burden itself depends on what each state 
considers the relevant criteria of a fair regulatory scheme to be.79 Among 
nations, there are widely divergent views of how to divide global greenhouse 
emissions, which current international law does not resolve.80 As a result, the 
 
76. See IPCC Report, supra note 56, at 2 (stating that the existence of global warming 
is “unequivocal” and that most of the temperature increase is “very likely” due to 
human activity); see also Wright, supra note 54, at 551-59 (noting scientific 
consensus that anthropogenic climate change is occurring and will persist with 
significant effects). 
77. See Anil Agarwal, Ctr. for Sci. & the Envt., Making the Kyoto Protocol 
Work: Ecological and Economic Effectiveness and Equity in the 
Climate Regime 11-12 (2000); Ambuj D. Sagar, Wealth, Responsibility, and 
Equity: Exploring an Allocation Framework for Global GHG Emissions, 45 Climate 
Change 511, 512 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and 
China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas 
Emitters, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1675 (2008); Sven Bode, Equal Emissions per Capita over 
Time—A Proposal To Combine Responsibility and Equity Rights (Hamburg Inst. of 
Int’l Econ., Discussion Paper No. 253, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=477281. 
78. Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization 14-43 (2002). 
79. See Daniel Bodansky, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, International 
Climate Efforts Beyond 2012: A Survey of Approaches (2004), available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/2012%20new.pdf (discussing over forty 
different approaches to dividing global greenhouse gases). 
80. Neither of the two existing multilateral agreements addressing climate change 
provides a roadmap of how to achieve a sustainable level of greenhouse gases. The 
first major climate change agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), commits all Member States to address climate 
change issues but does not include any concrete emissions targets. United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part 
II)/Add.1, 31 I.L.M. 849 (May 9, 1992). States can continue with their usual 
production of greenhouse gases and be in compliance with the treaty. There is 
near universal ratification of this agreement, arguably because the treaty imposes 
no real costs on governments. Jana von Stein, The International Law and Politics of 
Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the 
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alternative to an international agreement—uncoordinated national action—
will not be an effective means of addressing global warming. A series of 
uncoordinated national regulations will be better than no regulation (if carbon 
leakage levels are sufficiently low), but it will not provide a lasting solution to 
the dangers of climate change. This is not because any one nation has bad 
motives or is free-riding. Rather, if each government acts on its own conception 
of its fair level of emissions, then global emissions will be above sustainable 
levels. 
In this debate, there are no neutral principles. Even non-nation-based 
regulations, such as establishing a global uniform tax on all greenhouse gas 
emissions or a global cap-and-trade system, are controversial.81 A uniform tax 
 
Kyoto Protocol, 52 J. Conflict Resol. 243, 244, 248 (2008) (explaining how 
countries could join the UNFCCC without fear of violating the agreement 
because the treaty did not create sufficient concrete incentives for countries to 
improve their behavior). The next major agreement, the Kyoto Protocol, builds 
on the UNFCCC treaty and imposes an obligation on developed states to reduce 
emission levels using a current-levels dividing principle. Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, arts. 3-8, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/1997/L.7.Add.1, 37 I.L.M 22 (Dec. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Kyoto 
Protocol]. Developed countries, defined as those states identified in Annex I, have 
an obligation to reduce emissions from a year 1990 baseline. Kyoto Protocol art. 3. 
The list includes Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Community, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine. 
  Developing countries, identified in Annex II, have no specific obligations to 
reduce greenhouse gases at all. Kyoto Protocol art. 10. Going forward, engaging 
developing states in climate change mitigation is critical to achieving a viable 
solution. China has become the largest greenhouse gas producer; thus, a 
comprehensive treaty regime cannot exclude China from any obligations. Yet, 
unsurprisingly, extending the Kyoto Protocol’s current-levels dividing principle to 
developing countries is a nonstarter for developing countries. See Agarwal, supra 
note 77, at 3. Most notably, China and India have rejected the model of the Kyoto 
Protocol as the basis for a multilateral regime that could be expanded to include 
all major greenhouse gas producers. See Mark Landler, Event Shows U.S.-India 
Split on Climate, N.Y. Times, July 19, 2009, at A6. These governments argue that 
Kyoto’s dividing principle is unacceptable when applied to developing states 
because it does not allow developing countries to industrialize by “dirty” means 
(as the Annex I countries did), and it does not hold the developed world 
accountable for the decades of emissions that have created the current stock of 
greenhouse gases. Id. 
81. Cédric Philibert, Lessons from the Kyoto Protocol: Implications for the Future, 5 
Int’l Rev. Envtl. Strategies 311, 316 (2004) (noting that “[a]t the international 
level, uniform tax rates are required for reasons of cost-effectiveness, but the 
resulting distribution of costs may be unacceptable, especially by developing 
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or uniform market price assumes that all producers of greenhouse gases should 
pay the same amount for their emissions. Advocates from developing countries 
argue that developed countries industrialized when there was no tax and thus 
have gained the advantage of development for free.82 They argue that emissions 
from developing countries should be taxed at a lower level than those from 
developed states. Policymakers in developed states who worry that such lower 
tax rates would put their industries at a competitive disadvantage oppose this 
approach.83 
There are wide and significant differences among nations’ views of how to 
regulate the planet’s atmosphere.84 The fight is largely distributional: How 
much should each state have to contribute to mitigation efforts? This Section 
reviews three different approaches to distributing the costs of global greenhouse 
gas regulation. The Section discusses these approaches to demonstrate the 
heterogeneity of views concerning who should bear the costs of mitigating 
climate change. Recognizing the wide difference between states’ approaches to 
reducing greenhouse gas emission is critical to understanding why a series of 
unilateral measures will not be a successful global strategy. Each approach has 
significantly different implications for allocating emissions levels among states. 
If each state simply adopts its preferred approach, then global greenhouse gases 
will quickly surpass sustainable levels. Consequently, governments must reach 
an agreement on a coordinated strategy, i.e., a treaty, for there to be a lasting 
solution.  
The three approaches to greenhouse gas regulation reviewed in this Section 
are not the universe of possible approaches. Rather, these three approaches are 
representative of the types of concerns that states offer when advocating for 
their preferred approach. The three main approaches set different baselines by 
which to limit national emission levels. Those baselines are: (1) the state’s 
current level of emissions; (2) the state’s historic levels of emissions; and (3) the 
state’s level of emissions relative to some domestic measure, such as gross 
domestic product or population. Each approach creates a different principle for 
dividing use rights to the global commons. The goal here is to demonstrate the 
wide difference in states’ positions, not to advocate one principle over another.  
Industrialized states have endorsed the view that an international 
agreement should adopt status quo levels of emissions and reduce emission 
 
countries, likely to ask for side-payments” and that these issues would make a 
global tax extremely difficult). 
82. J. Timmons Roberts & Bradley C. Parks, Ecologically Unequal Exchange, Ecological 
Debt, and Climate Justice: The History and Implications of Three Related Ideas for a 
New Social Movement, 50 Int’l J. Comp. Soc. 385, 388 (2009) (describing the view 
that the developing world is owed an “ecological debt” by industrialized nations 
and discussing the development of a “climate justice” movement expressed by the 
G-77 and China at UNFCCC negotiations). 
83. Id. 
84. See Bodansky, supra note 79. 
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levels from this baseline.85 This dividing principle thus gives precedence to the 
state’s current level of emissions. This is the approach of the Kyoto Protocol for 
commitments by developed states and the approach of current United States 
legislative proposals. Whatever the state’s level of emissions was in a chosen 
year—the year 1990 for the Kyoto Agreement (only with regard to developed 
states) and the year 2005 for the Lieberman-Warner bill (for all states)—
becomes the standard from which the state must progressively decrease 
emissions levels.86 On one side, this seems to be an intuitive bargaining 
principle: There is a global problem, and all states (or all developed states for 
the Kyoto Protocol) need to take steps to decrease their greenhouse gas 
emissions by some roughly equal rate. To the extent that we think international 
bargaining includes a status quo bias, this approach is cognitively appealing 
because it requires the least deviation from current practice.87 Yet it is also an 
odd principle because it is the opposite of the “polluter pays” rule.88 Rather than 
having an obligation to contribute more to the mitigation efforts, countries 
retain greater rights to emit if they have been significant emitters in the past. 
Developing states have resisted the idea that 1990 emissions levels or current 
emissions levels should be used as a baseline to reduce emissions globally. The 
Chinese and Indian governments, in particular, have been vocal in criticizing 
the current levels of emissions standard as one that would make it more 
difficult to raise living standards in already poor countries.89 
In stark contrast with the current level of emissions standard, the “climate 
debt” or historic levels of emissions standard focuses on which states have 
 
85. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 80, art. 3, para. 1 (obligating Annex I countries to 
reduce emissions by varying amounts below 1990 levels by 2008 to 2012). 
86. Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong., tit. I,  
§ 1201. The text places a ceiling on the total emissions allowances granted by the 
bill to covered entities. These goals are based on 2005 levels, mandating reductions 
of 4% by 2012, 19% by 2020, and 71% by 2050. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 80, art. 3, 
para. 1. 
87. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision 
Making, 1 J. Risk & Uncertainty 7 (1988). 
88. Stiglitz, supra note 52, at 175 (“[N]o one has really provided a reasoned defense 
of the premise underlying Kyoto.”); see also Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, Principle 16, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1, 31 I.L.M. 874 (June 14, 
1992) (“National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account 
the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with 
due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and 
investment.”). 
89. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1600 (discussing the Chinese government’s 
demand that climate change mitigation efforts not restrict its ability to develop); 
Landler, supra note 80. 
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caused the current environmental harm.90 Under this approach, developed 
states have created the global warming crisis and, thus, should bear the financial 
burdens of keeping emissions within sustainable levels. Much closer to the 
polluter pays principle, this approach is supported largely by states that are 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change: island nations, states 
with low-lying cities, and states that do not have the wealth or technology to 
adapt to new climate patterns. It is not the mirror image of the current levels 
approach, however, because recent major emitters (namely China and India) 
would not have the same obligation to reduce emissions radically. Advocates of 
the climate debt approach to dividing emissions rights generally demand that 
developed nations make drastic cuts in their emissions levels—decreases of 40% 
to 50% of 1990 levels—by 2020.91 As one would expect, policymakers in the 
developed world reject this approach as requiring too sweeping a change from 
the status quo.92 
Other standards have been put forward that would link the states’ 
emissions rights to national measures.93 These standards embody a no-fault 
principle as to past greenhouse gas contributions by dividing emissions by 
metrics such as gross national product (GNP) or population size. The GNP 
measure tends to favor developed states, which have higher levels of production 
and is opposed by developing states, which argue that limiting a state’s 
emissions rights is de facto limiting its means of development (and thus reifying 
the current levels approach). The per capita approach favors developing states 
that already have low per capita rates of greenhouse gas emissions. The per 
capita principle is an appealing one if the global atmosphere is considered a 
good to which all people should have an equal share. The per capita differences 
between states are also striking. In 2006, the average greenhouse gas emission 
 
90. See Denis McDonough & Rebecca Schultz, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Balancing Our 
Climate Debt: The Group of Eight Have an Obligation, June 1, 2007, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/06/g8_climate_debt.html; Posting 
of Andrew C. Revkin to DOT EARTH, http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2009/11/10/fresh-demands-from-front-line-states-in-climate-fight/ (Nov. 10, 2009, 
10:56 EST). 
91. Posting of Elisabeth Rosenthal to DOT EARTH, http:// 
dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/10/rich-poor-divide-still-stalls-climate-
accord/ (Apr. 10, 2009, 10:26 EDT). 
92. Singer, supra note 78, at 14-43; Stiglitz, supra note 52, at 175; see also Rosenthal, 
supra note 91 (reporting that developed states consider such a radical revision 
absurd). 
93. See Bodansky, supra note 79 (summarizing forty-four different principles); see 
also Agarwal, supra note 77, Bode, supra note 77; Eric A. Posner & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Should Carbon Emission Be Allocated on a per Capita Basis?, 97 Cal. L. 
Rev. 51 (2009) (arguing against this standard); Mathias Risse, Who Should 
Shoulder the Burden? Global Climate Change and Common Ownership of the Earth 
(Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
RWP08-075, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338257. 
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rate per capita in India was 1.16 tons and in China was 4.58 tons.94 By contrast, 
the American per capita rate was 19.78 tons, and the German per capita rate was 
10.40 tons.95 
None of the three approaches outlined here need be adopted in its pure 
form. An international agreement can emerge from a mix of these 
considerations—for instance, a current levels baseline model with significant 
financial and technological transfers to developing states. Nonetheless, states 
need to engage one another in international negotiations to reach such an 
agreement. Because there is such a wide divergence between the views of 
governments on what a “fair” division of greenhouse gases entails, it is highly 
unlikely that a consensus will emerge without international talks. A 
compromise is reachable but almost certainly will not emerge from a series of 
unilateral national-level measures.  
In sum, policymakers and academics alike acknowledge that the only means 
of successfully addressing the threat of climate change is an international 
agreement that includes the major greenhouse gas producers and most of the 
potential major greenhouse gas producers. Given the current state of 
technology, no one state can provide a clean atmosphere unilaterally, so 
collective action is necessary. Although uncoordinated national measures may 
succeed in lowering a nation’s greenhouse gas emissions, these measures cannot 
assure that worldwide emissions will not be excessive. Only through coordinated 
multilateral action, i.e., treaty negotiations, can governments be confident that 
any mitigation efforts they take will result in a comprehensive solution to the 
dangers of climate change. 
 
III. Analysis of Legislative Proposals 
 
This Part examines four causal narratives of how national legislation can 
lead to greater support for an international agreement: (1) that national 
legislation directs economic resources to industries that will support an 
international agreement; (2) that national legislation demonstrates 
international leadership on climate negotiations, which will make an agreement 
easier to reach; (3) that industry will demand an international solution rather 
than accept a patchwork of national-level standards; and (4) that experience 
with a national-level environmental regime will foster a popular constituency 
that will demand a more comprehensive solution. It discusses current legislative 
proposals as examples of how national legislation can have mixed effects on 
international bargaining. It is not intended to be a section-by-section review of 
American legislation on climate change (the final form of which has yet to take 
shape). Rather, the following discussion illustrates how different legislative 
 
94. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/each-
countrys-share-of-co2.html (last visited July 1, 2010). 
95. Id. 
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provisions can have effects that are both helpful and detrimental to the 
conclusion of a comprehensive global warming agreement. In addition, it 
discusses legislative provisions as if they are independent, treating the domestic 
cap-and-trade program, for instance, separately from the proposal for a carbon 
tariff. This approach makes sense because the dynamic effects of each provision 
are different. The political reality in Washington may be that these provisions 
are linked; legislative support for a cap-and-trade program may be contingent 
on the acceptance of trade restrictions on foreign goods. Although a final 
legislative proposal may be a package deal politically, this analysis treats the 
design elements independently to highlight the dynamic and static effects of 
each.  
Section III.A details the conventional wisdom that the proposed legislation 
is a stepping stone to an international agreement. Sections III.B and III.C 
analyze two design elements of the legislative proposals: (1) the proposed 
national cap-and-trade system; and (2) the proposed carbon tariff. The cap-
and-trade system has mixed dynamic effects. The most positive effects are the 
incentive for low-cost reducers of emissions to cut their emissions significantly, 
and the incentive for greater research (at home and abroad) into cleaner 
sources of energy. There are some negative dynamic effects, such as the location 
of emissions-heavy production processes outside of the regulatory areas. The 
most important effect is not immediate carbon leakage, but “political 
leakage”—the growth of an industrial sector that has reason to oppose an 
international agreement. The second design element, the carbon tariff, also has 
mixed effects. Used as a multilateral sanctioning device, i.e., used as part of an 
international regime, a carbon tariff can help solve the free-riding and hold-out 
problems inherent in an international public goods agreement. Yet when the 
carbon tariff is used by one state in isolation, the negative dynamic effects are 
significant. When implementing a carbon tariff, a government unilaterally 
implements what it believes is an adequate environmental regulation. This can 
complicate international bargaining over greenhouse gas reductions and can 
distort public opinion about what a “fair” climate change agreement entails.  
 
A. The Value of National Legislation 
 
In the absence of prospects for a comprehensive international agreement in 
the near term, national and local governments have turned to domestic-level 
legislation to combat climate change.96 Although there are serious questions 
about how effective such national or subnational measures will be in addressing 
global climate change issues, domestic legislation is politically achievable 
without multilateral consensus. Policymakers seeking to satisfy constituent 
 
96. The European Union has established an emissions trading system. See Council 
Directive 2003/87, Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Allowance Trading Within the Community and Amending Council Directive 
96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32. 
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demands that greenhouse gas emissions should be addressed are looking to 
their own legislatures.97  
The conventional wisdom among interest groups, policymakers, popular 
commentators, and academics is that national climate change legislation is 
useful not because of its direct environmental effects but because it puts the 
nation on a path to achieving a comprehensive climate change solution. The 
United States could not provide the public good of sustainable global levels of 
greenhouse gases unilaterally, even if there were the political will to decrease 
American greenhouse gas emissions radically (a claim for which there is little 
evidence). Consequently, U.S. action needs to be seen in the context of 
collective action. The premise behind national-level climate change legislation is 
that it will lead to political changes at home and abroad;98 that is, national-level 
emissions reductions will create a positive political feedback effect that will spur 
other states to alter their emissions levels as well and lead to greater support for 
an international agreement.  
Discussions of the Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Security 
Act (the climate change bill that passed the House on June 26, 2009) as well as 
the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act (the Senate bill that failed to pass 
in 2008) reflect the accepted wisdom that national legislation will be a building 
block to an international agreement.99 Although these climate bills are not 
sufficient to solve the problem of climate change, they set the United States on 
the path to greater international reductions in carbon emissions, greater 
domestic reductions, or both. For instance, President Obama’s support for the 
Waxman-Markey Bill is premised on the assumption that it will produce a 
political dynamic that will lead to greater emissions reductions in the future.100 
 
97. In addition to federal measures, there are a variety of state and local climate 
change measures. Many states have adopted policies either unilaterally or 
regionally. For an accounting of such policies, see Pew Ctr. on Global Climate 
Change, Climate Change 101: State Action (2009), available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Climate101-State-Jan09_1.pdf. 
98. Posting of Andrew C. Revkin to DOT EARTH, http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes 
.com/2009/06/26/the-climate-bill-in-climate-context/ (June 26, 2009, 14:23 EDT) 
(“Some longtime opponents of regulatory approaches to climate run the numbers 
and show the scant impact of the bill in isolation. Supporters of the bill readily 
acknowledge that American action in isolation would be insufficient. But they say 
our action would galvanize the globe, including developing countries, to take on 
commitments, as well.”). 
99. Kevin Drum, Is Waxman-Markey Worth It?, Mother Jones, July 1, 2009, 
http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2009/07/waxman-markey-worth-it (arguing 
that the bill is worth passing because it provides the United States with a 
framework for more serious action in the future). 
100. See Roundtable Interview, supra note 18. Former Vice President Al Gore noted 
that “[t]his bill doesn’t solve every problem, . . . but passage today means that we 
build momentum for the debate coming up in the Senate and negotiations for the 
treaty talks in December which will put in place a global solution to the climate 
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President Obama responded to a question regarding European Union leaders’ 
concerns that emission targets in the Waxman-Markey climate change bill are 
too weak by stating:  
Now, [Chancellor Angela Merkel and other European Union leaders] 
would like to see even more aggressive targets. My argument to her and 
to the Europeans is we don’t want to make the best the enemy of the 
good . . . . I think legitimately people want the framework in place and 
for us to make strong, steady, gradual progress, as opposed to trying to 
shoot for the moon and not being able to get anything done. . . . I think 
that the Waxman-Markey bill represents a great start.101 
Among academic commentators, the consensus is also that unilateral 
climate change legislation is a building block to a comprehensive agreement.102 
In fact, the vast majority of academic debate has been over whether national 
 
crisis.” John M. Broder, House Backs Bill, 219-212, To Curb Global Warming, N.Y. 
Times, June 27, 2009, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
101. Roundtable Interview, supra note 18. 
102. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System To Address 
Climate Change, 32 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 293 (2008) (arguing that the United 
States needs to adopt a national climate change program); Joseph E. Stiglitz, A 
New Agenda for Global Warming, 3 Economists’ Voice 1, 1-4 (2006) (calling on 
the United States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and advocating that other 
states impose trade sanctions on the United States if it does not); Freeman & 
Guzman, supra note 4, at 62 (“Though international cooperation should be 
pursued, the reluctance of others to fully engage the problem is not a sound 
reason for inaction by the United States. Whatever others do, the United States 
should move aggressively to reduce global GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions.”); 
see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate 
Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap-and-
Trade, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, 21 (2009) (“[T]he United States remains a leading 
source of greenhouse gas emissions, and it is unlikely that the developed world 
will agree to mandatory reductions in 2012, if the United States has not taken steps 
to reduce its emissions before then. The new President and Congress in 2009 face 
the imperative of adopting measures to control greenhouse gas emissions in the 
United States and thereby establishing American credibility for the international 
negotiations on the next climate change treaty.”). 
  Some commentators argue that unilateral measures should be taken in 
coordination with international action. See Stewart & Wiener, supra note 64, at 
122-30 (arguing for a two-step program). Under Stewart and Wiener’s framework, 
the United States first would adopt a voluntary emissions reductions program to 
help it prepare for later emissions reductions. The United States only would adopt 
the second step of mandatory reductions when it signed an international 
agreement with other major emitters. Id. 
  This view represents the conventional wisdom, but there are dissenting 
voices. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1600-01 (arguing that unilateral 
action by the United States produces little to no environmental benefit and thus 
would not pass a cost-benefit analysis); Sunstein, supra note 77, at 1677 (same). 
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legislation should take the form of a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax, 
rather than whether national legislation should be undertaken at all.103 A more 
limited debate also exists regarding the efficacy of state-level measures as a 
means of achieving (the presumably positive step) of uniform federal 
legislation.104  
Similarly, interest groups have supported national legislation based on the 
idea that it is the first step to a more comprehensive solution. The United States 
Climate Action Partnership (USCAP), an NGO and industry group that lobbies 
on climate change,105 argues that the “U.S. tradition on environmental 
 
103. The literature is large. See, e.g., Stewart & Wiener, supra note 64 (preferring the 
cap-and-trade system); Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 102; Nathaniel O. 
Keohane, Cap and Trade, Rehabilitated: Using Tradable Permits To Control U.S. 
Greenhouse Gases, 3 Rev. Envtl. Econ. & Pol’y 42 (2009); Joseph E. Aldy & 
William A. Pizer, Issues in Designing U.S. Climate Change Policy (Res. for the 
Future Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 08-20, 2008), available at 
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-08-20.pdf; Gilbert Metcalf & David 
Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law Working Paper 
No. 254, 2009); Stavins, supra note 102; see also Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The 
Perfect, the Good, the Planet, N.Y. Times, May 18, 2009, at A23 (arguing for a cap-
and-trade system). 
104. See Erik B. Bluemel, Regional Regulatory Initiatives Addressing GHG Leakage in the 
USA, in Climate Change and European Emissions Trading: Lessons for 
Theory and Practice 225 (Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters eds., 2008) (arguing 
in favor of state-level measures); Carlarne, supra note 36 (same); Coglianese & 
D’Ambrosio, supra note 42 (arguing against the utility of state-level measures); 
DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 36, at 1500 (arguing that state-level measures are 
important catalysts for federal regulation); Douglas Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, 
Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1621 (2008) (discussing the difficulty of 
establishing a robust state-level carbon trading system given American 
constitutional constraints); Joseph Allan MacDougald, Why Climate Law Must Be 
Federal: The Clash Between Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and State Greenhouse 
Gas Trading Systems, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1431 (2008) (same); Patrick Parenteau, 
Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way: The States Tackle Climate Change with Little 
Help from Washington, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1453 (2008) (arguing in favor of state-
level measures); Lesley Wexler, Take the Long Way Home: Sub-Federal Integration 
of Unratified and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Law, 28 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1, 18-20 
(2007) (providing a framework for states and towns to implement the Kyoto 
Protocol without federal action); Wiener, supra note 42 (arguing against the 
utility of state-level measures); see also Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: 
Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1827 (2008) 
(advocating the use of public nuisance laws to decrease greenhouse gas emissions 
within the United States). 
105. USCAP industry members include Alcoa, Dow, Duke Energy, DuPont, the Ford 
Motor Company, General Electric, General Motors, Johnson & Johnson, PepsiCo, 
Shell, and Siemens. Its NGO members include the Environmental Defense Fund, 
the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Nature Conservancy, and the World 
Resources Institute. United States Climate Action Partnership–About Us, 
http://www.us-cap.org/about-us (last visited July 1, 2010). 
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protection seems to dictate that the most difficult step is the first one . . . . But 
we shouldn’t think for a second our job is done once the bill is passed.”106 The 
Union of Concerned Scientists, an NGO of environmental scientists, has 
supported domestic action, observing that the view among most advocacy 
groups involves an agenda through which they work together to strengthen the 
bill and ultimately see it enacted, while blocking political initiatives to water it 
down. The group added: “We also have to remember that it took many years to 
pass the Clean Air Act, which was later significantly strengthened through 
various amendments.”107 Even popular commentators have expressed the belief 
that the bill, even if flawed, is a step forward.108 Paul Krugman has written that 
opponents of Waxman-Markey are “making the perfect the enemy of the 
good.”109 
In spite of the consensus that national climate legislation is a stepping stone 
to a more comprehensive solution, the mechanism for how it will occur is not 
fully articulated.110 By more precisely articulating the underlying political logic, 
we see that it is far from obvious that the political dynamic is always supportive 
of greater environmental regulation. In particular, measures that are positive in 
a static sense can be self-defeating in a dynamic sense. This area is one where 
the institutional design of the national-level measure matters tremendously. As 
this Section demonstrates, however, each of these mechanisms has the potential 
to fizzle or even backfire, reducing political support for a comprehensive 
multilateral solution. All of these mechanisms can lead to greater support for an 
international agreement, but they can also entrench resistance to such an 
agreement. In other words, each can cut both ways. It is thus hard to predict 
whether national legislation will create greater support for an international 
agreement or entrench resistance against it. The framework developed here 
 
106. A Good Start, supra note 46 (statement of Angela Anderson, Program Director for 
the U.S. Climate Action Network). 
107. Id. (statement of Liz Martin Perera, Legislative Representative on Climate for the 
Union of Concerned Scientists); see also id. (statement of Denis Hayes, Chairman 
of the American Solar Energy Society) (“Waxman-Markey’s flaws are huge but 
discrete, and they can be addressed in the years ahead.”). 
108. Id. (statement of Paul Hawken) (arguing that the Waxman-Markey bill 
“represents a direction, not a plan” and expressing the hope that “the bill will 
begin to form the basis of a more comprehensive energy strategy”). 
109. Krugman, supra note 103. 
110. The consensus that the Waxman-Markey bill is a step forward to an international 
agreement is not unanimous. Most notably, Greenpeace has opposed the 
Waxman-Markey bill, stating: “The giveaways and preferences in the bill will 
actually spur a new generation of nuclear and coal-fired power plants to the 
detriment of real energy solutions. To support such a bill is to abandon the real 
leadership that is called for at this pivotal moment in history.” Press Release, 
Greenpeace, Greenpeace Opposes Waxman-Markey: Climate Bill Not Science-
Based; Benefits Polluters (June 25, 2009), available at http://www.greenpeace 
.org/usa/press-center/releases2/greenpeace-opposes-waxman-mark. 
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examines how national legislation will influence future political bargaining, 
both at home and abroad. Not all national-level measures are worth the 
political capital needed for passage. Some are worth pursuing but some are self-
defeating. 
  
B. The Proposed Cap-and-Trade System 
 
1. The Cap-and-Trade Model 
 
Almost all legislative proposals in the United States involve a cap-and-trade 
regime,111 which is a system that imposes a ceiling on the level of emissions and 
then establishes a competitive market for the sale of emission rights.112 A cap-
and-trade system essentially privatizes the right to produce greenhouse gas 
emissions and turns the right into a tradable commodity.113 This system deprives 
industrial producers (such as electricity plants) of the right to produce 
unlimited quantities of greenhouse gases. Under such a regime, the electricity 
plant would have to present an emissions credit for each unit of greenhouse gas 
it produced. If the electricity plant had an insufficient number of credits to 
cover its emissions, then it would have to purchase additional credits from 
other owners of credits. If the electricity plant had more credits than it needed, 
then it could sell its unused credits to other polluters. The process of buying 
and selling credits creates a market, where the price of a credit is determined by 
the demand and supply of credits.114 
Credits can initially be dispensed in a number of ways.115 The government 
determines how many total credits will be issued and thus sets a ceiling (or cap) 
on the level of greenhouse gas emissions in an industry. These credits can then 
be either allocated to industries (for free or for a set price) or sold at auction. 
The initial dispensing of credits has significant distributional effects—the 
government either gains the revenue from selling the credits at auction or gives 
the value of these credits to the industry—but the initial allocation should not 
 
111. Keohane, supra note 103, at 42. 
112. Brian C. Murray & Heather Holsterman, Climate Change, Cap-and-Trade and the 
Outlook for U.S. Policy, 34 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 699, 707-10 (2009); Robert 
N. Stavins, supra note 102, at 296-99; see also Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative 
Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Proposal Is Best?, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
123, 135-138 (2007) (discussing specific legislative proposals). 
113. For a general defense of a pollution rights system versus the alternative 
command-and-control system, see Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, 
Reforming Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1335-40 (1985). See also Carol 
M. Rose, Hot Spots in the Legislative Climate Change Proposals, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
Colloquy 189, 195 (2008) (describing cap-and-trade systems as creating property 
and discussing the political pitfalls of this approach absent sufficient monitoring). 
114. Stavins, supra note 102, at 298-99. 
115. Flatt, supra note 112, at 139-42; Stavins, supra note 102, at 298. 
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affect the functioning of the emissions credit market.116 Once the government 
has allocated the credits, the price of each credit is determined by market forces, 
namely the industry need for more credits to cover its pollution and the 
number of excess credits available.117 
A cap-and-trade regime, like a standard tax, raises the costs of carbon 
pollution. As the price of carbon increases, carbon reduction measures become 
more cost-efficient, so industries are more likely to take these measures. Other 
sources of energy also become more price-competitive. The promise of 
increasing costs on carbon production creates incentives to invest in cleaner 
energy sources because there is an expectation that the price of carbon 
emissions will continue to grow. All of this is good for the environment. 
 
2. The Waxman-Markey Cap-and-Trade System 
 
The Waxman-Markey bill establishes a cap-and-trade system for industries 
that are heavy greenhouse gas producers, including electricity producers, oil 
refineries, natural gas suppliers, and iron, steel, cement, and paper 
manufacturers.118 Starting in 2012, all of these industries would have to present 
an emissions credit for each metric ton of carbon dioxide they produce. Other 
sources of pollution are brought under the cap by 2016.119 The bill sets a cap for 
 
116. Stavins, supra note 102, at 317-19. 
117. Id. at 298 (“Regardless of how allowances are distributed initially, the need to 
surrender valuable allowances to cover any emissions and the opportunity to 
trade those allowances create a price signal for emissions. In turn, this price signal 
provides firms with an incentive to reduce emissions that influences their 
production and investment decisions. Because allowances are tradable, the 
ultimate distribution of emission reduction efforts necessary to meet the overall 
emissions cap is determined by market forces.”). 
  Government action can influence the market in a number of ways. If the 
government decides to issue more credits than it initially allocated, then 
speculation can drive the price of credits down (because of the fear that there will 
be a flood of new supply). Changes in the government’s definition of offsets can 
also affect the price of credits by increasing or decreasing the alternatives to 
credits. 
118. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong., tit. III, subtit. E, § 312 (2009). For a detailed summary of 
the bill, see Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Pew Center Summary of 
H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-
Markey) (2009) [hereinafter Pew Center H.R. 2454 Report], available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/waxman-markey-detailed-summary-
july2009.pdf. 
119. In 2012, the program will cover an estimated 67% of U.S. emissions, while in 2014 
it will cover 78% and in 2016 will reach its maximum of 85%. John Larsen & 
Robert Heilmayr, World Res. Inst., Emissions Reductions Under the 
Waxman-Markey Discussion Draft 4 (2009), http://pdf.wri.org/ 
usclimatetargets_2009-04-22.pdf. 
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greenhouse gas production from these sources based on 2005 levels. Table 3 
shows the emissions level goals and the total number of emissions credits 
available per year. 
 
Table 3: Waxman-Markey Emissions Schedule120 
Year Cap on emissions, as reduction 
from 2005 levels 
Number of emissions credits 
allocated, in billions (each credit 
covers one ton of carbon) 
2012  3%  4.627 
2020 17%  5.056121 
2030 42%  3.533 
2050 83%  1.035 
 
In addition, the Waxman-Markey bill provides for offsets, which are credits 
for activities that decrease carbon levels, such as reforestation or preventing 
deforestation.122 If an industry supports such an activity, then the industry can 
reduce the number of emissions credits that it needs to cover its pollution. As 
an example, assume that an electricity plant produces 100,000 tons of carbon 
dioxide per year. After 2012, the plant would have to provide 100,000 emissions 
credits to the government per year. If the electricity plant pays to put a forest 
under conservation (so the trees could not be harvested) and this is determined 
to capture 20,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions, then the electricity 
plant would have to present only 80,000 emissions credits for that year.  
Under the Waxman-Markey bill, polluters can claim up to two billion 
metric tons of carbon dioxide per year from offsets.123 Offsets are not included 
 
120. H.R. 2454, tit. III, subtit. A, § 311. 
121. The number of emissions credits increases from 2012 to 2020 (in spite of the fact 
that carbon emissions are supposed to be lower by 2020) because the law 
progressively covers more entities. 
122. See Steven Ferrey, When 1 + 1 No Longer Equals 2: The New Math of Legal 
“Additionality” Controlling World and U.S. Global Warming Regulation, 10 Minn. 
J. L. Sci. & Tech. 591, 604-10 (2009); Flatt, supra note 112, at 142-45; Murray & 
Holsterman, supra note 112, at 711-15; James L. Olmstead, Carbon Dieting: Latent 
Ancillary Rights to Carbon Offsets in Conservation Easements, 29 J. Land 
Resources & Envtl. L. 121, 122-24 (2009); Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest 
Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized Certification of Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C. J. Int’l 
L. & Com. Reg. 851, 858-71 (2009); see also Elizabeth Rosenthal, In Brazil, Paying 
Farmers To Let the Trees Stand, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 2009, at A1 (discussing such 
programs in Brazil and raising questions about these programs’ effectiveness). 
123. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), rather than the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), determines what qualifies as an offset. Granting the 
offset authority to the USDA has been criticized because this agency does not have 
expertise in valuing carbon dioxide emissions. See Allison Winter, Farm Groups 
Prevail as House Climate Bill Puts USDA in Charge of Ag Offsets, Env’t & Energy 
Daily, June 24, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/ 
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in the national emissions cap. Thus, the actual level of U.S. carbon emissions 
per year is two billion tons higher than the scheduled amount. For instance, in 
2012, covered industries will actually be able to emit up to 6.627 billion tons of 
carbon dioxide rather the published cap of 4.627 billion tons. Finally, the 
Waxman-Markey bill distributes emissions credits on a mixed free allocation 
and auction system. That is, when the government grants the yearly level of 
emissions credits, the government provides some of the credits at no cost to 
industry or public entities (including states) and sells the rest at a competitive 
price.124 These allocations are scaled back over time.125 
 
3. The Effect of the Waxman-Markey Cap-and-Trade System on 
International Negotiations 
 
Imposing a cap-and-trade regime domestically directs economic resources 
toward industries in the United States that will have a greater incentive to 
support an international agreement. This happens for three reasons. First, U.S. 
industries that have to pay the carbon tax (directly through emissions credits or 
indirectly through higher electricity prices) will want other countries to have 
the same restrictions. Second, if the United States develops cleaner energy 
sources, these clean energy industries will want to expand the market for their 
products by raising environmental standards abroad. Third, and possibly most 
importantly, if there is innovation in the clean energy market, it has the 
potential to lessen the costs of addressing climate change, nationally and 
internationally. Innovation eases the distributional problem at the international 
level and makes an agreement easier to accept. These positive feedback effects 
are significant in developing support for an international agreement. As these 
effects are well-recognized in the academic and political press, this Subsection 
does not expand on them other than to emphasize the magnitude of the 
positive effects (particularly the innovation element). 
On the economic reallocation downside, there are two main effects. First, 
there will be some carbon leakage to other states—some industries will shift 
production to other countries based on a number of factors such as tax rates, 
labor markets, the stability of the legal system, international barriers to trade, 
and transportation costs. On the margin, higher regulatory prices at home 
encourage relocation abroad. In the static analysis, this means that overall 
carbon emissions may increase. More important is the dynamic political effect 
of this leakage. If high-emissions industries move to developing countries, then 
we are changing the economic structure of those nations through selection 
 
06/24/24climatewire-farm-groups-prevail-as-house-climate-bill-pu-24287.html 
(describing the debate over whether the EPA or the USDA should run the 
program and noting environmental groups’ preference for the EPA). 
124. See Pew Center H.R. 2454 Report, supra note 118, at app. A (summarizing the 
allocation of emissions allowances). 
125. Id. 
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effects. Those economies may become more dependent on high carbon 
emissions and, worse, these industries may have greater political influence in 
developing states than they do in industrialized states. We might call this 
“political leakage.” Although the cap-and-trade system increases demand in the 
United States for an international agreement, political leakage may decrease 
support for one in developing countries. In addition, the expectation that 
developing countries will progressively benefit from more relocation as the 
United States imposes gradually stricter environmental regulations makes the 
developing states want to remain open to the relocation of high-emissions 
industries. 
It is unclear how much of the current impasse between the developed and 
developing countries observed at the G8 and the Copenhagen climate 
negotiations is a result of exactly these effects from EU regulations. Although 
the extent of current carbon leakage from EU emissions reductions is hard to 
determine (estimates range from as low as 5% to as high as 130%126), the 
expectation that developing countries can gain a competitive advantage from 
unilateral actions by developed states can decrease their support for an 
international agreement that includes their greenhouse gas emissions. 
The primary noneconomic rationale for the Waxman-Markey bill is to 
establish U.S. leadership in international climate change negotiations. The view 
that the bill will signal leadership to the international community is widespread 
in the popular press. The Pew Center on Climate Change argues that: 
[t]he future of the international climate effort hinges in large measure 
on the United States, which as the world’s largest economy and 
cumulative emitter of greenhouse gases, has both the capacity and the 
responsibility to lead. Other major emitters are unlikely to commit to 
stronger action without the United States.127 
USCAP, the industry-environmentalist coalition, has also long argued that U.S. 
leadership is necessary for an international agreement on climate change and 
thus the United States needs to take domestic action to cut emissions, even if 
other nations do not take such action.128 
 
126. See Babiker, supra note 62 (citing other studies that claim leakage rates are as low 
as 5% but finding that leakage could be as high as 130%). 
127. Pew Ctr. on Climate Change, Climate Change 101: International Action 
7 (2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Climate101-Intl-
Jan09.pdf. 
128. U.S. Climate Action P’ship, A Blueprint for Legislative Action: 
Consensus Recommendations for U.S. Climate Protection Legislation 3 
(2009), available at http://www.us-cap.org/pdf/USCAP_Blueprint.pdf (“USCAP 
believes that international action is essential to meeting the climate challenge. U.S. 
leadership is essential for establishing an equitable and effective international 
policy framework for robust action by all major emitting countries. USCAP 
believes that adoption of mandatory U.S. climate policy is an essential 
precondition for a full and effective international framework. The mechanism 
that Congress establishes as part of U.S. climate legislation can play a crucial role 
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Environmental groups’ support for the Waxman-Markey bill was explicitly 
linked to the international signal that the legislation would have.129 Earthjustice 
supported the Waxman-Markey legislation, arguing that the “bill would 
provide needed momentum for an international climate agreement.”130 The 
Environmental Defense Fund described the legislation as historic because it 
places the United States in “a new position of leadership in the global effort to 
protect the climate.”131 The bill’s detractors also explained their resistance in 
terms of the expected international effects. Greenpeace opposed the bill’s 
“retreat from aggressive targets” because “[t]his legislation sends a strong and 
unmistakable signal to the world that the United States is not yet ready to show 
the leadership necessary to reach a strong agreement at Copenhagen in 
December [2009].”132 The World Wildlife Fund expressed its view that the 
Waxman-Markey bill “falls short of what is needed to achieve a global 
agreement to manage climate change” and “[u]nless strengthened, this bill 
could undermine America’s ability to secure an effective international 
agreement.”133 The key issue here is a comparative analysis of different signals: 
 
in encouraging broad international action. However, U.S. action to implement 
mandatory measures and incentives for reducing [greenhouse gas] emissions 
should not be contingent on simultaneous action by other countries.”). 
129. See A Good Start, supra note 46 (statement of Joseph Romm, Senior Fellow at the 
Center for American Progress) (noting that if the United States does not take any 
legislative action then “[s]erious U.S. action would be off the table for years, the 
effort to jumpstart the clean-energy economy in this country would stall, the 
international negotiating process would fall apart, . . . any chance of a deal with 
China would be dead[, and w]arming of 5 degrees C or more by century’s end 
would be all but inevitable”). The Climate Group, a European environmental 
organization, agrees, noting that with the legislation, “the Obama Administration 
would have a domestically valid basis from which to negotiate international 
reduction targets in Copenhagen [in December 2009].” Press Release, Climate 
Group, Waxman-Markey Bill: Despite Compromises, A “Major Step in the Right 
Direction” (May 22, 2009), available at http://www.theclimategroup.org/our-
news/news/2009/5/22/waxmanmarkey-bill-despite-compromises-a-major-step-in-
the-right-direction/. 
130. Press Release, Earthjustice, Earthjustice Thanks Chairmen Waxman and Markey 
for Leadership on Combating Climate Change (Mar. 31, 2009), available at 
http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/2009/earthjustice-thanks-chairmen-
waxman-and-markey-for-leadership-on-combating-climate-change.html. 
131. Press Release, Environmental Defense Fund, Statement of EDF President Fred 
Krupp on House Passage of the American Clean Energy and Security Act (June 
26, 2009), available at http://www.edf.org/pressrelease.cfm?contentID=10049. 
132. Press Release, Greenpeace, Greenpeace Opposes Waxman-Markey (June 25, 
2009), available at http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/press-center/releases2/ 
greenpeace-opposes-waxman-mark. 
133. Press Release, World Wildlife Fund, World Wildlife Fund Statement on the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act (May 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.worldwildlife.org/who/media/press/2009/WWFPresitem12397.html. 
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no national legislation, unambitious national legislation, and ambitious 
national legislation. Certainly, the bill demonstrates that the United States 
recognizes that global warming is a real environmental phenomenon that can 
lead to devastating consequences. This posture is arguably a change from 
United States policy that did not actively deny the existence of climate change 
but undertook little effort to decrease carbon emissions. Yet it is hard to argue 
that the acknowledgement of climate change is leadership.  
Leadership involves both willingness to cooperate and the terms on which 
one will cooperate. The Waxman-Markey bill signals to the international 
community a willingness to reduce carbon emissions but also may signal the 
lack of political support for dramatic cuts. The current Waxman-Markey bill 
has been criticized from numerous sources for being insufficiently ambitious, 
particularly in the short term.134 The United States has adopted modest goals for 
decreasing greenhouse gas emissions (17% of 2005 levels by 2020) and very 
liberal policies for carbon offsets (meaning that the actual cut in emissions will 
be much lower than 17%).135 The rest of the world may see this as a statement 
that the United States is unwilling to shoulder much of the cost of climate 
change mitigation. Even with a Democratic President and Democratic control 
of both houses of Congress, the United States appears unable to adopt 
ambitious measures. 
The crucial question here is how the signal will be interpreted compared to 
other signals. If the United States government fails to adopt any climate change 
legislation, then this failure would obviously be a worse signal. Beyond failing to 
lead, inaction would indicate that the United States is simply unwilling to 
engage in significant reductions of greenhouse gas pollution. The Waxman-
Markey bill is an improvement over no action, yet it highlights a lack of political 
 
In the same vein, Congressman Dennis Kucinich of Ohio voted against the bill 
because the proposal did not go far enough to decrease emissions and thus 
“undermines our bargaining position in international negotiations in 
Copenhagen and beyond.” Kucinich argues that “[a]s the biggest per capita 
polluter, we have a responsibility to take action that is disproportionately stronger 
than the actions of other countries.” Press Release, Rep. Dennis Kucinich, 
Kucinich: “Passing a Weak Bill Today Gives Us Weak Environmental Policy 
Tomorrow” (June 26, 2009), available at http://kucinich.house.gov/News/ 
DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=134813. 
134. Broder & Kanter, supra note 35 (reporting on Europe’s pleasure with the Obama 
Administration’s seriousness regarding climate change but displeasure with 
American short-term goals to reduce emissions); Greenpeace, supra note 132. 
135. H.R. 2454, tit. III, subtit. A, § 311 (2009); see Stephan Power, Impact of ‘Offsets’ To 
Reduce Emissions Is Uncertain, Wall St. J., June 27, 2009, at A2 (describing how 
two billion tons of the proposed reductions in greenhouse gas emissions could 
come from the offset system rather than current polluters); see also Posting of 
James Kanter to Green, http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/do-
carbon-offsets-cause-emissions-to-rise/ (May 8, 2009, 6:50 EDT) (discussing 
research that suggests offsets do not lead to emission reductions and are difficult 
to verify). 
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will to lead in climate change negotiations. The bill signals that the United 
States is willing to curb greenhouse gas emissions but only to levels that would 
still allow the country to be among the planet’s largest polluters, particularly 
over the next decade. Thus the bill may be a step toward an international 
agreement in that it demonstrates the willingness of the United States to engage 
in carbon emissions reductions, but it may simultaneously be a stumbling block 
as it announces how the United States expects to cooperate. This may be an 
advantageous bargaining position for the United States in terms of minimizing 
costs if an agreement is reached (by attempting to credibly signal that the 
United States will not bear more than a certain share of the common costs), but 
it also increases the likelihood that no international agreement will be 
reached.136 
The third mechanism, creating a patchwork of regulations that inhibits 
interstate or international trade, is not one that comes into play in the cap-and-
trade system. Unlike the California legislation that threatened to raise fuel 
economy standards for automobiles sold in California, the Waxman-Markey 
bill does not impose product standards, but rather taxes the carbon emissions 
in the manufacturing process.137 That is, the bill does not regulate carbon 
emissions by banning the sale of end products that do not meet certain fuel-
economy standards. For instance, American and foreign car companies are free 
to continue to sell SUVs and trucks that get relatively poor gas mileage on the 
American market.138 As a result, there is no political rationale for manufacturers 
to demand uniform regulation at a higher government level (here, the 
international level). The bill permits the imposition of a carbon tariff on 
imported goods by 2020 (a design element that this Article addresses next) but 
only on goods from countries that have inadequate environmental regulations 
on the manufacturing process.139 
The process of passing domestic legislation also raises public awareness of 
the problem of climate change. This can lead the public to change its beliefs 
about what needs to be done to address the issue. If the legislation makes the 
problem of climate change more salient or makes the public willing to shoulder 
a larger portion of the cost of an international agreement, then the legislation is 
a step forward. The cap-and-trade system can also build greater support among 
the public for additional environmental legislation by demonstrating that the 
legislation carries good value. If the public sees the benefits of the regulation 
and observes that the economic costs are low, then the public might demand 
 
136. See Putnam, supra note 5. 
137. See H.R. 2454, tit. III, subtit. A, § 311. 
138. Interestingly, the bill does prohibit individual states from imposing any additional 
emissions cap at the state level until 2018. See id. tit. III, subtit. C, § 335; see also id. 
tit. III, subtit. B, § 321 (requiring that permits previously issued by California, the 
Western Climate Initiative, or the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative be traded in 
for the new federal allowances, thereby placing everyone on one system). 
139. Id. tit. IV, subtit. A, § 401. 
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higher levels of regulation. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the 
cost of the Waxman-Markey bill on the average household will be about $175 
per year,140 but other estimates are much higher.141 If the costs of the climate 
change regulation are low, then the national legislation may garner widespread 
public support for greater regulation.142 But if the cost of regulation is high or 
particularly salient (e.g., higher energy bills), then the public’s support for 
further measures may be eroded.143 
Here, the Waxman-Markey bill’s subsidization of consumer electricity is 
notable.144 Subsidizing electricity goes against the bill’s broader efforts to reduce 
carbon emissions. If electricity prices are subsidized, then consumers will 
presumably use more electricity than they would at the market price, not less. 
Yet subsidizing electricity is important for maintaining public support for the 
cap-and-trade system. Although dramatically higher electricity prices may 
reduce carbon emissions in a static sense, higher prices may also undermine 
support for the current system and for later additions to the program.145 Thus, 
in a dynamic analysis of the political economy of global warming, subsidization 
of consumer electricity prices is most likely a step forward to greater national 
and international regulation. 
Finally, the cap-and-trade system can create positive feedback effects by 
building political bonds. Several environmental and industry groups worked 
together to lobby for the Waxman-Markey bill. This collaboration might create 
a lasting coalition that will make bargaining at the international level easier, 
because the base of domestic support for an international agreement is already 
established. But there are reasons to doubt that the coalition built to support 
the Waxman-Markey bill will also support an international agreement. First, 
 
140. Cong. Budget Office, The Estimated Costs to Households from the Cap-
and-Trade Provision of H.R. 2454, at 2 (2009), available at http:// 
energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090620/cbowaxmanmarkey.pdf. 
141. At the high end, the Heritage Foundation predicts a cost of more than $1200 a 
year. William Beach et al., Son of Waxman-Markey: More Politics Makes 
for a More Costly Bill (2009), http://www.heritage.org/Research/ 
EnergyandEnvironment/wm2450.cfm. 
142. See Roundtable Interview, supra note 18 (statement of President Obama) (noting 
twice the importance of protecting consumers from spikes in electricity prices). 
143. There is also concern that the American public does not understand what the real 
costs of effective action will be. See Cap and Trade, with Handouts and Loopholes, 
Economist, May 23, 2009, at 33, 34 (noting that “America’s leaders do not seem 
to think Americans are ready for straight talk about” how much further action 
will cost). 
144. See H.R. 2454 tit. III, subtit. B, § 321 (regarding emissions allowances for electric 
utilities that must be used to benefit consumers); see also id. tit. IV, subtit. C, § 431 
(regarding tax credits and rebates for low-income households to help defray 
energy costs). 
145. See supra text accompanying note 142. 
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industry groups that formed the coalition with environmental groups may have 
supported a national-level agreement as a means of avoiding greater regulation 
at the international level. To the extent that industries can say that they made 
significant progress on climate change issues by supporting a domestic measure 
that they can live with, these industries may resist an international agreement 
that requires higher levels of regulation. Second, industries might have only 
supported the Waxman-Markey bill because of the emissions subsidies 
provided by the federal government. If an international agreement would 
require further reductions and additional government subsidies were not 
forthcoming, then industry support could evaporate.  
Whether the domestic legislation increases support for an international 
agreement also depends on the content of the international agreement. 
Although it is hard to predict what the exact content of the agreement will be, 
we can be relatively confident that the agreement will not divide greenhouse gas 
emissions between states based on historic levels of emissions. Thus the United 
States legislation, which promises to reduce our emissions levels to 97% of 2005 
levels by 2012 and 80% of 2005 levels by 2020, probably still provides for a much 
higher level of emissions than an international agreement would mandate. An 
international agreement might require the United States to decrease its 
emissions levels more radically (imposing higher costs on American industries), 
while requiring that developing countries only slow their rate of emissions 
growth. American industry is unlikely to support such an agreement even if it 
supported domestic legislation. 
In sum, the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade system has the potential for 
significant positive dynamic effects although the picture is mixed. The system 
provides important financial incentives to invest in low-emissions sources of 
energy that could decrease the cost of emissions reductions both at home and 
abroad. Lowering the costs of emissions reductions also eases the distributional 
concerns at the international level making it easier for states to form a 
comprehensive climate change agreement. The Waxman-Markey bill also 
adopts counterintuitive policies (such as subsidizing consumers’ electricity use) 
to maintain public support for environmental regulations. Yet the bill has the 
potential for negative feedback effects as it may lead to the growth of high-
emission industries, which will oppose an international agreement, in 
developing states. 
 
C. The Proposed Carbon Tariffs 
 
1. The Carbon Tariff Model 
 
A carbon tariff is a tax assessed at the nation’s border that raises the costs of 
imported goods.146 The tax can be structured in a number of ways. The first 
design issue is whether the carbon tax will be imposed multilaterally or 
 
146. Gary C. Hufbauer, Steve Charnovitz & Jisun Kim, Global Warming and 
the World Trading System 38-46 (2009). 
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unilaterally. If a number of states establish a climate change treaty regime, then 
those states could impose a carbon tariff on any state that chooses not to join 
the regime. Used multilaterally, a carbon tariff can prevent states from free-
riding on the efforts of others, which is a serious problem in a global public 
good scenario. The downside of the multilateral carbon tariff is that it requires 
an international agreement among a core group of states. Alternatively, a state 
can unilaterally impose a carbon tariff by applying a border tax to imports from 
states with inadequate environmental regulations or to imports that are 
produced by emissions-heavy processes.147 The drawback of the unilateral 
carbon tariff is that each state can independently decide what good 
environmental policy is and impose carbon tariffs on imports that do not meet 
those criteria, which can result in conflicting national standards. 
An issue for both multilateral and unilateral carbon tariff systems is 
deciding the magnitude of the border tax and what goods should be subject to 
it. The goal of the multilateral carbon tariff is to have states join the 
international agreement, so the size of the tariff should be sufficiently high to 
make the costs of joining the international agreement less than the costs of 
remaining outside of the agreement. In theory, the tariff need not apply only to 
goods with an emissions-heavy production process. If the goal is to have states 
join the environmental agreement, then the best strategy may be to impose a 
high tax on goods produced by politically powerful domestic entities.148 Here, 
the carbon tariff functions like any other sanctioning regime.149 Governments 
may want to impose the tariff on emissions-heavy products to reduce carbon 
leakage in the immediate term, but the tariff need not be limited to these goods. 
 
147. See Aaron Cosbey, Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Border Carbon 
Adjustment 1 (2008), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/cph_trade 
_climate_border_carbon.pdf; Houser et al., supra note 66, at 29-37; Hufbauer 
et al., supra note 146, at 39-45; Howard Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade 
Measures To Protect the Global Environment, 83 Geo. L.J. 2131 (1995); Laura Nielsen 
& Steve Charnovitz, Trade and Climate Change: Limits for Consumption Based 
Trade Measures?, 7 Manchester J. Int’l Econ. L. (forthcoming 2010). 
148. See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 403-06 (2003); 
Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 354-57 (2000). 
149. This is the approach to retaliation in the WTO regime (although there are some 
restrictions on when cross-sectoral and cross-agreement retaliation can be used 
under Article 26 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)). See Jide 
Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the 
World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 Theoretical 
Inquiries L. 215, 222-28 (2005); Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The 
Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade 
Organization, 13 J. Legal Stud. 179, 188-92 (2002). 
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The goal of a unilateral carbon tariff is less clear. A tariff can be a means of 
encouraging other states to adopt higher environmental standards, although 
what are adequate standards is determined by the tariff-imposing state 
unilaterally. A carbon tariff would only apply to the tariff-imposing state’s 
internal market (not to several states’ markets as with a multilateral tariff).150 
Consequently, the effectiveness of a unilateral tariff depends on the importance 
of the tariff-imposing state’s market to foreign exporters. The larger a state’s 
market, the greater the ability it has to encourage other states to adopt higher 
environmental standards. 
A state may also have the goal of attempting to preserve its national 
competitiveness.151 Industry groups often criticize environmental regulation 
because it allegedly puts national industry at an unfair competitive disadvantage 
to industries in other nations that lack such regulation.152 Industry groups often 
advertise a carbon tariff as a means of leveling the playing field.153 There are two 
concerns with this approach to defending a state’s competitiveness. First, a 
carbon tariff does not preserve the competitiveness of a nation’s exports. The 
tariff applies only to the state’s internal market and does not raise the cost of 
 
150. The most effective carbon tariff would be a multilateral one that includes the 
world’s largest import economies. Together, the European Union and the United 
States consume over half of the world’s exports. E.U. imports represent 
approximately 40% of the world’s total exports. American imports represent 
14.5%. See World Trade Org., International Trade Statistics 2008, at 11 
(2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/its2008 
_e.pdf. 
151. See Houser et al., supra note 66, at 2; Hufbauer et al., supra note 146, at 12; see 
also Cap-and-Trade Bill Will Protect U.S. from Unfair Competition, Dingell 
Predicts, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 372 (Mar. 13, 2008) (discussing how a carbon 
tariff could protect the international competitiveness of American industry). 
152. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas J. Gibson, President & CEO, Am. Iron & Steel Inst., 
to Members of the House Steel Caucus (Aug. 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.steel.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=200910&CONTENTID=33768&T
EMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm; see also Houser et al., supra note 66, at 2-
10; Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating 
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1212 
(1977) (discussing the competitive advantage that one jurisdiction can gain by 
having environmental policies that are less restrictive than competing 
jurisdictions). But see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: 
Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1211-12 (1992) (arguing that competitive 
advantages based on lower regulation do not necessarily lead to a race to the 
regulatory bottom). 
153. See Jagdish Bhagwati & Petros C. Mavroidis, Is Action Against US Exports for 
Failure To Sign Kyoto Protocol WTO-Legal?, 6 World Trade Rev. 299, 309 
(2007); The Conscience of a Liberal, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/ 
06/29/climate-trade-obama/ (June 29, 2009, 9:07 EDT) (stating that a carbon tariff 
is “a matter of leveling the playing field”). 
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foreign competitors’ goods in foreign markets. Consequently, a carbon tariff 
only protects goods in the national market, which will be useful to import-
competing industries but less so to export-oriented industries. Second, 
establishing what a level playing field is can be difficult, particularly with the 
global warming issue. Whether the carbon tariff is a fair correction for 
differences in environmental regulation,154 on the one hand, or an unfair 
protection of domestic producers,155 on the other, is determined by our theory 
of how much greenhouse gas pollution each nation should be allowed to 
produce. This point engages the same issues currently under discussion at the 
international level of how to divide the world’s greenhouse gases; whether 
China is producing too many greenhouse gas emissions requires a theory that 
determines how much pollution China is permitted to produce.156 Because there 
is no consensus on how much greenhouse gas a state should be allowed to 
produce, there is no uncontroversial or normatively neutral means of applying 
a carbon tariff. 
Consequently, a key feature of any domestic legislation that chooses to 
incorporate a carbon tariff is how to judge what is adequate or comparable 
action. As discussed in the following Subsections, governments tend to judge 
other nations’ emissions levels based on the government’s preferred theory for 
dividing global greenhouse gases. In the Lieberman-Warner bill, the United 
States would impose a carbon tariff on states that did not achieve the same 
proportionate reduction in greenhouse gases as the United States.157 This metric 
matches the American position that states should freeze greenhouse gas 
pollution at current levels and decrease emissions from this baseline. Thus, if 
the United States reduced emissions by 7% from a 2005 baseline, then other 
states would have to do the same to avoid the imposition of a carbon tariff. This 
metric is far from uncontroversial as it gives greater rights to pollute in the 
future to states that have historically polluted the most.158 
 
154. Joseph Stiglitz has argued that countries should be applying countervailing duties 
to the United States based on an “antidumping” or actionable subsidy basis. See 
Stiglitz, supra note 52, at 177-78. As Joost Pauwelyn discusses, Stiglitz’s theory 
does not fit well within the current international trade doctrine regarding 
subsidies or dumping. See Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Change Policy and 
Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law 13-16 
(Nicholas Inst. Working Paper, No. 07-02, 2007), available at http:// 
nicholas.duke.edu/institute/internationaltradelaw.pdf. 
155. Ex-USTRs Urge Caution as Congress, Administration Draft Climate Policies, 26 Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1152 (Aug. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Ex-USTRs Urge Caution] 
(describing the letter sent by former United States Trade Representatives warning 
that carbon tariffs can be a “disguised form of protectionism”). 
156. See supra Section III.B. 
157. S. 3036, 110th Cong., tit. XIII, §§ 1311-1315 (2008). 
158. See supra Section II.C. 
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Needless to say, other states would not agree on this basis for applying a 
carbon tariff. The European Union could choose to apply a carbon tariff to any 
state that has not signed on to the Kyoto Protocol (which is what some 
European leaders are threatening if the United States adopts a carbon tariff).159 
The EU standard would include the United States but not China or India. In 
addition, China and India could apply a tariff based on their per capita 
emissions levels. The tariff would apply to any state with per capita emissions 
over the Chinese level or the Indian level. This standard would include the 
United States and the European Union. As a consequence, the application of a 
carbon tariff does not necessarily lead to a uniform isolation of states with 
“poor” environmental regulation. Rather, the lack of consensus regarding how 
much carbon each state should be allowed to produce creates a patchwork of 
tariff barriers that encompass different conceptions of adequate environmental 
policies.160 So, in judging the effect of a carbon tariff, one needs to include the 
costs and benefits of the United States tariff as well as the costs and benefits of 
having several carbon tariffs based on each country’s view of what the division 
of greenhouse gases should be.161 As of the writing of this Article, no country has 
imposed a carbon tariff, although several countries have stated that they will do 
so if the United States proceeds with a carbon tariff.  
 
 
159. France To Push EU Member States To Embrace Carbon Border Taxes, 26 Int’l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 817 (June 18, 2009) (describing the efforts of French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy to have the EU implement a carbon tariff on non-Kyoto members); see 
also Frank Biermann & Rainer Brohm, Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Without 
the USA: The Strategic Role of Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, 4 Climate 
Change 289 (2005) (providing a rationale for such a measure under GATT law). 
160. For such reasons, United States Trade Representatives have been wary of carbon 
tariffs because they fear retaliation from other states. See Letter from Susan
Schwab, U.S. Trade Representative, to Rep. Joe Barton, Ranking Member of the 
House Energy and Commerce Comm. (Mar. 4, 2008), available at 
http://commontragedies.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/document_daily_01.pdf 
[hereinafter Schwab Letter] (noting that carbon tariffs “could easily backfire. . . . 
[a]nd other countries could well turn to [carbon tariffs] themselves and develop 
their own import restrictions, based on their own unilateral definitions of what 
constitutes adequate action by other countries”). Statements from the White 
House in 2009 were skeptical about the use of a carbon tariff. See Greg Hitt & 
Naftali Bendavid, Obama Wary of Tariff Provisions, Wall St. J., June 29, 2009, at 
A3. 
161. See Schwab Letter, supra note 160; see also Climate Change: Competitiveness 
Concerns and Prospects for Engaging Developing Countries: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Reginald Jones Senior 
Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/Hearings/PDF/110 
-eaq-hrg.030508.Hufbauer-testimony.pdf (discussing how the most relevant risk 
of a carbon tariff was the threat of tit-for-tat retaliation). 
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2. Waxman-Markey and the Lieberman-Warner Carbon Tariffs  
 
Both the Waxman-Markey bill and the Lieberman-Warner bill provide for 
the establishment of a carbon tariff, but the two bills do so on different terms. 
Under the Waxman-Markey bill, a carbon tariff would apply to imports from a 
foreign state starting in 2020, if two conditions applied: (1) the state had not 
joined an equitable international agreement; and (2) the state’s greenhouse gas 
intensities in the relevant sectors were higher than those of the United States.162 
If a country did not sign onto the agreement by that time (or an agreement was 
not achieved by that time), then only exports from sectors that had higher 
greenhouse gas intensities than the United States would be subject to the 
tariff.163 To reduce the threat of carbon leakage, the Waxman-Markey bill 
provides rebates to carbon-intensive firms until 2035.164  
The Lieberman-Warner bill would establish a stricter carbon tariff, one that 
would most likely apply to more countries. Also, beginning in 2020, a carbon 
tariff would be applied to exports from countries that have not taken action 
“comparable” to that of the United States.165 Comparable action is defined as 
achieving the same percentage decrease in greenhouse gas emissions as the 
United States achieves from a 2005 baseline.166 Thus, if the United States 
managed to achieve a 17% decrease in emissions from 2005 levels by 2020, 
countries that did not also achieve the same percentage decrease would be 
subject to a carbon tariff. This would almost certainly include most developing 
countries where rates of emissions are still increasing (although their per capita 
rate of emissions are far better than that of the United States) and could 
conceivably include some developed countries (who might have better 
percentage rates of decrease if judged from a 1990 baseline but have worse rates 
if judged from a 2005 baseline).  
The Waxman-Markey bill has yet to pass the Senate, and members of the 
Senate appear much more supportive of a carbon tariff than their counterparts 
in the House.167 There are demands from key lawmakers that the Senate’s 
 
162. H.R. 2454 tit. IV, subtit. A, § 401. The carbon tariff would not apply to countries 
that the United Nations has classified as “least developed countries,” countries 
that produce less than 0.5% of the global greenhouse gases, or countries that 
represent less than 5% of U.S. imports in a particular sector. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. The Waxman-Markey bill begins to phase out the rebates in 2025, but the 
program continues until 2035. Id. 
165. S. 3036 tit. XIII, §§ 1311-1315. 
166. Id. The President must notify countries of the estimated percentage change in U.S. 
emissions over a ten-year period. Id. § 1313(c). As with the Waxman-Markey bill, 
there are exceptions for economically small states. See supra note 162. 
167. Senate To Revise Carbon Tariffs, Kerry Says; Other Democrats Seek Stronger 
Protections, [2009] World Trade Org. Rep. (BNA) D2 (July 9, 2009) (quoting 
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version of the bill include a stricter carbon tariff, so that the final Waxman-
Markey version would impose the tariff beginning in 2012, when the domestic 
cap-and-trade program begins.168 Thus, the final bill to emerge from Congress 
may have yet another version of a carbon tariff.169 
 
3. The Effect of the Proposed Carbon Tariff on International 
Negotiations 
 
Carbon tariffs are double-edged as a policy tool. The economic goal of a 
carbon tariff is to preserve the competitiveness of national industries (and thus 
prevent carbon leakage to lower regulation states), but the tariff can also be a 
source of protection for national industries (and thus provide industries with a 
competitive advantage that they will be loath to forego). This Article examines 
both possibilities. To the extent that it is narrowly tailored to industries that 
face high regulatory costs and easy relocation abroad, a carbon tariff can have 
positive feedback effects for the demand for an international agreement. The 
carbon tariff can keep industries in a high-regulation jurisdiction and thus 
increase the demand for cleaner sources of energy. In addition, carbon leakage 
to developing countries slows. The political demands within developing 
countries to resist an international agreement because of the competitive 
advantages will lessen. Both of these effects should aid international 
negotiations. 
A carbon tariff can also have some negative dynamic feedback effects. If the 
carbon tariff applies to industries more broadly, the probability that it is being 
used for protectionist purposes increases. Firms are more likely to receive 
protection that they do not need. For instance, under the Lieberman-Warner 
bill, firms from developed countries with strong environmental regulation 
would be subject to a carbon tariff if the exporting country did not match the 
U.S. percentage decrease in greenhouse gas emissions. In these cases, domestic 
firms and foreign firms are arguably already playing on a level field in terms of 
environmental regulation. (The threat of a carbon tariff is particularly galling 
for developed countries that have joined the Kyoto Protocol as Annex I 
countries and thereby adopted costly environmental regulations while the 
United States refused to adopt any greenhouse gas limits.) Here, the carbon 
tariff would provide the domestic firm with a price advantage over its foreign 
rivals that is unrelated to differences in national regulations. If carbon tariffs are 
used as a tool of protection, domestic firms will fight to hold onto them once 
 
Senator Kerry as stating: “We have already come to the conclusion in working on 
the Senate bill that we are going to have to change [the carbon tariff provision].”). 
168. Id. (discussing some Democratic Senators’ views that stricter carbon tariffs are 
needed and that the current House bill is unacceptable). 
169. Obama Urged To Support Border Adjustments in Bill To Cap U.S. Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1235 (Sept. 17, 2009) (reporting on a letter 
sent by members of the House supporting a stricter carbon tariff). 
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they are provided. Domestic firms may resist an international agreement on 
climate change if it entails removing the carbon tariff against key competitors. 
Thus, domestic legislation can be a stumbling block to an international 
agreement; it creates an advantage for domestic firms, which exists only as long 
as international negotiations on a comprehensive agreement languish. 
Examined under this framework, the Waxman-Markey bill is a notable 
improvement over the Lieberman-Warner bill. The Waxman-Markey bill 
reduces carbon leakage by providing rebates to carbon-intensive sectors rather 
than imposing a carbon tariff. Unlike a carbon tariff, the rebates are not linked 
to the successful conclusion of an international agreement.170 Thus, domestic 
industries have an economic incentive to support an international agreement as 
a way to impose the higher regulatory costs on foreign firms. In addition, if a 
carbon tariff is applied, it will be applied in a fine-grained manner. Only foreign 
goods in sectors that have higher greenhouse gas intensity than U.S. firms would 
be subject to the tariff. This tariff would hit many developing countries but 
would be less likely to include developed states with high environmental 
standards. 
By contrast, the Lieberman-Warner bill would apply the carbon tariff to 
more of the carbon-intensive goods produced in a country that did not match 
the U.S. percentage rate of decrease in greenhouse gases. This approach lumps a 
country’s goods together for the purposes of the carbon tariff instead of 
applying a sector-by-sector test as the Waxman-Markey bill does. In addition, 
the Lieberman-Warner bill could apply to developed states that have high 
environmental regulation but nonetheless are unable to achieve the U.S. rate of 
emissions reductions. The United States is relatively late in adopting 
greenhouse gas regulations for a developed country and thus might be able to 
achieve a greater percentage decrease in emissions than other developed 
countries that have equally rigorous (or more rigorous) environmental 
standards.171 As a result, this provision of the Lieberman-Warner bill is more 
likely than the provision in the Waxman-Markey bill to lead to negative 
political feedback effects, where domestic firms view the carbon tariff as a 
competitive advantage over foreign firms and thus oppose an international 
agreement that would withdraw these benefits. 
 
170. The rebates are allocated regardless of the status of international negotiations. 
H.R. 2454 tit. IV, subtit. A, § 401. 
171. The Lieberman-Warner bill uses a 2005 emissions level as a baseline. This 
disadvantages many Kyoto Protocol Annex I countries that started reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions in the 1990s in fulfillment of their legal obligations to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions relative to 1990 levels. Consequently, many 
developed states already had undertaken the most cost effective emissions 
reduction methods by 2005. The United States had not done so by 2005, and thus 
its rate of decrease in greenhouse gas emissions may be higher (judged against a 
baseline of 2005) than equally rigorous action taken by other developed states. See 
supra Section III.A. 
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As a matter of leadership in international negotiations, a carbon tariff is 
controversial. If an environmental agreement has the support of a core set of 
states, a multilateral carbon tariff may be an effective means of encouraging 
wide membership. Where there is not an international agreement in place, 
however, the threat of a unilateral carbon tariff can complicate international 
negotiations.172 The international system is still in the process of creating 
consensus on how to address climate change. Countries still have widely varying 
views on the best approach to achieving sustainable levels of emissions.173 The 
threat of a carbon tariff has damaged this country’s attempt to provide 
leadership in international climate change negotiations, because it de facto 
sanctions foreign countries if they do not meet the standards unilaterally 
established by the United States. 
Developing nations view the U.S. demand that other nations either match 
American reductions in emissions (the Lieberman-Warner draft) or mandate 
industries where energy-intensity levels match or exceed those of U.S. industries 
(the Waxman-Markey draft) to avoid a carbon tariff as a step back in 
international negotiations. They note that their per capita emissions rates are 
far below American rates and emphasize that, on the per capita standard, they 
already have “cleaner” economies than the United States. Developing nations 
view greenhouse gas emissions as a by-product of development.174 Thus, 
proposals to freeze their current rates of emissions are effectively demands that 
they sacrifice their development goals.175 For instance, the Indian government 
has refused to accept binding limitations on emissions until it achieves a higher 
level of development. Responding to American requests to adopt caps on 
emissions, the Indian environmental minister, Jairam Ramesh, publicly rebuked 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her visit to India for the American 
threat to impose a tariff on Indian goods when the country had such low levels 
of per capita emissions.176 Developing countries also argue that the threat of a 
carbon tariff ignores developed states’ responsibilities for the current climate 
 
172. Christopher Weber & Glen Peters, Climate Change Policy and International Trade: 
Policy Considerations in the United States, 37 Energy Pol’y 432 (2009); Ex-USTRs 
Urge Caution, supra note 155 (quoting a letter from four former U.S. Trade 
Representatives that urged Congress “to give the Administration the authority, 
flexibility and support to negotiate mutually satisfactory outcomes with 
recalcitrant nations. . . . One cannot legislate what must be negotiated.” 
(alteration in original)) . 
173. See supra Section II.C. 
174. See Keith Bradsher, American Officials Push China on Climate, N.Y. Times, July 16, 
2009, at A10; Landler, supra note 80. 
175. See Shai Oster, Beijing Softens Stand on Emissions Cap, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 2009, 
at A7 (noting that China is considering legislation that would result in its carbon 
dioxide emissions peaking in 2030, the same time that China expects its own gross 
domestic product to exceed that of the United States). 
176. Landler, supra note 80. 
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crisis.177 China’s lead climate change negotiator, Yu Qingtai, put the point this 
way: “The developed countries, in realizing their industrialization, have 
discharged a large amount of greenhouse gases in the course of one or two 
centuries. The cumulative emissions by the developed countries have caused 
global warming. Who should take the historical responsibilities?”178  
Here again, the carbon tariff in the Waxman-Markey bill, while potentially 
a stumbling block, represents an improvement over the Lieberman-Warner 
tariff. The Waxman-Markey bill gives the President discretion on when to apply 
the carbon tariff, which allows the tariff to be a flexible and sophisticated 
instrument of diplomacy. Hence, the legislation could provide countries with a 
disincentive from delaying a compromise for too long, but it gives countries the 
space to reach a consensus without the use of sanctions. By contrast, the 
Lieberman-Warner bill is a blunt instrument that does not aid the search for an 
international compromise. The carbon tariff would apply to countries that do 
not reduce their greenhouse gas emissions at the same rate as the United States.  
The Lieberman-Warner proposal further undermines United States 
leadership because, until a new international agreement is established, there is 
not a safe harbor for countries that wish to sign on to an international 
agreement (as there is no treaty regime to join). Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol is 
not sufficient to exempt a country from the American carbon tariff because the 
United States does not view the Kyoto Protocol as an equitable agreement.179 
Thus, many developed and developing countries, which would prefer to 
cooperate internationally but are insufficiently influential to bring the major 
players to an agreement, cannot avoid American carbon tariffs even if they are 
actively engaged in the international negotiation process. 
If other states responded in kind to the United States carbon tariff, then the 
tariff has the potential to create an industry demand for an international 
agreement. A patchwork of national-level carbon tariffs could be a significant 
 
177. See Oster, supra note 175 (noting that China views limits on emissions as a form of 
discrimination against poorer countries). This does not mean, however, that 
China is not taking steps to include environmental goals in its development plan. 
While relying on coal to produce most of its power, the Chinese government has 
been building high efficiency power plants at rates much higher than the United 
States. Keith Bradsher, China Far Outpaces U.S. in Building Cleaner Coal-Fired 
Plants, N.Y. Times, May 11, 2009, at A1. 
178. Michael Wines, China Sees Progress on Climate Accord but Resists an Emissions 
Ceiling, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 2009, at A8. 
179. See S. 3036, 110th Cong., tit. VI, § 6003 (2008) (defining U.S. negotiation goals for 
an international treaty as an agreement that commits “all major greenhouse gas-
emitting nations to contribute equitably to the reduction of global greenhouse gas 
emissions”); see also S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (declaring that any 
international agreement that does not place emissions caps on developing 
countries would not be equitable). 
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barrier to trade.180 For instance, steel exports from the United States might face 
one carbon tariff to enter the European Union market, another tariff to enter 
the Chinese market, and yet a third to enter the Canadian market. If the barriers 
to trade created by this patchwork regime were sufficiently high, then national 
industries in the United States and abroad might prefer an international 
agreement that imposed uniform environmental regulations simply as a means 
of creating certainty.181 Creating barriers could also be counterproductive to 
climate change negotiations, however. Some industry groups may prefer an 
international agreement to eliminate barriers to trade, but other industry 
groups may appreciate having more barriers to trade.182 For instance, American 
industries with carbon-heavy production processes may lobby for a carbon 
tariff as protection from international competition and subsequently fight any 
legislation that would remove the carbon tariff.183 Consequently, carbon tariffs 
may entrench national positions in international negotiations rather than 
making compromise easier to achieve. 
One of the greatest concerns with a carbon tariff is its potential effect in 
framing public opinion regarding what the continuing responsibility of the 
United States is and what a fair international agreement would entail. The 
national legislation has the potential to lull the public into believing that the 
nation has done its part in addressing the issue of climate change.184 A carbon 
tariff reinforces this view; the measure creates a framework that defines national 
regulation of greenhouse gases as adequate while defining many foreign 
regulations as inadequate. This view may give credence to a counterproductive 
belief that, having passed national legislation, the nation has fulfilled its 
responsibilities for controlling global warming and that further measures are 
the responsibility of other nations, such as China and India.  
In a related vein, the carbon tariff can skew the public’s view of what 
standards a fair international agreement would adopt. The concern is that the 
national regime’s approach to applying a carbon tariff will become the public’s 
metric for judging whether an international agreement is equitable. The 
Lieberman-Warner carbon tariff effectively requires other states to freeze 
emissions at 2005 levels and reduce emissions at the same rate as the United 
States. The Waxman-Markey bill requires states to have industries with the 
same carbon intensity as American industries. Yet both of these standards are 
nonstarters for developing states, who are at different stages of development 
and have very different views of what an equitable international agreement 
 
180. See Schwab Letter, supra note 160 (noting that a carbon tariff “could easily 
backfire. . . . [a]nd other countries could well turn to [carbon tariffs] themselves 
and develop their own import restrictions, based on their own unilateral 
definitions of what constitutes adequate action by other countries”). 
181. Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 39; Elliott et al., supra note 39. 
182. Houser et al., supra note 66, at 2-10. 
183. See supra p. 298. 
184. See Coglianese & D’Ambrosio, supra note 42, at 1425. 
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would involve. In this case, the carbon tariffs may be priming the American 
public to resist an international agreement that adopts standards different from 
the carbon tariff. 
In sum, a multilateral carbon tariff, undertaken as part of an international 
climate change agreement, is likely to be a building block to a comprehensive 
solution to the problem of global warming. The tariff imposes a cost only on 
states that refuse to join the international regime. This fact carries two benefits. 
First, it helps reduce the relocation of production to states that remain outside 
of the regime. Second, it links contribution to a nonexcludable good (the global 
atmosphere) to an excludable good (access to the markets of the regime 
members) in a uniform manner and thus gives nonmembers an incentive to 
join the environmental regime. Nonmembers of the environmental regime can 
be economically isolated. 
By contrast, the Waxman-Markey and the Lieberman-Warner carbon 
tariffs lack many of the multilateral tariff’s benefits. The unilateral tariff is less 
effective in preventing the relocation of industries because the unilateral tariff 
only applies to the home state’s internal market. In addition, the unilateral tariff 
does not target states that refuse to sign an international agreement but rather 
all of the states that the home state considers not to be doing their part. Other 
states can play this game as well and impose their own unilateral carbon tariffs. 
The result is that many states will be subject to a host of different carbon tariffs 
(the United States is unlikely to pass the China’s standards for a carbon tariff), 
rather than a few states being economically isolated.  
 
IV. Implications and Extensions  
 
This Article has examined the effects of national legislation on the 
provision of global public goods through the lens of climate change, but the 
implications of this framework are not limited to the global warming context. 
Regulation of global public goods in other areas faces similar two-level games. 
National-level legislation influences international negotiations concerning 
public goods in positive and negative ways by changing the incentives of private 
and public actors both at home and abroad. This Part discusses the issue of 
international corruption and American legislative efforts to address this 
problem unilaterally through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The 
issue of international corruption is too complex to address fully in this work, 
but the example of the FCPA demonstrates that many of the same dynamic 
feedback effects that exist in the climate change context emerge here as well. 
National legislation changed the global politics of corruption, sometimes in 
ways that were beneficial and, other times, in ways that were 
counterproductive.185  
 
 
 
185. See Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 665 (2004). 
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A. Global Anticorruption Efforts 
  
Governmental corruption takes a heavy toll on many societies: It 
undermines countries’ achievement of their development goals, provides 
undemocratic regimes with the resources to maintain power, and warps 
policymaking in democratic regimes.186 Corruption is a “global bad” because 
the costs of corruption are not limited to the nations in which it occurs.187 
Criminal organizations that exist due to corruption in one country (such as 
Mexican drug cartels or the Russian mafia) export crime to other states.188 
Corruption also reduces the value of foreign aid and leads to higher levels of 
communicable disease.189 Finally, it distorts international commerce; firms that 
 
186. See John Brademas & Fritz Heimann, Tackling International Corruption, Foreign 
Aff., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 17, 18-19 (1998); see also Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption: 
The Facts, Foreign Pol’y, Summer 1997, at 114. Governmental corruption is now 
largely accepted as a problem for economic growth and good governance. This 
has not always been the case, however. In the 1960s, many political and economic 
theorists viewed corruption as a means of improving the efficiency of developing 
countries. See, e.g., Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing 
Societies (1968) (arguing that corruption helped development in many 
societies); J.S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
61 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 417, 420 (1967) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages 
of corruption and noting that corruption could be beneficial since it allows for 
greater entrepreneurship). This theory is now largely discredited based on 
empirical studies. See, e.g., Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, Does 
Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?, 122 Pub. Choice 69, 91 (2005) 
(rejecting strongly the idea that corruption aids economic development even in 
nondemocratic regimes); see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values 
and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. Legal 
Stud. S141, S158-60 (2002) (tracing the history of scholarly thinking on corruption 
and development). 
187. See Patrick Glynn et al., The Globalization of Corruption, in Corruption and the 
Global Economy 6, 10-17 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997). 
188. Robert S. Leiken, Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic, Foreign Pol’y, 
Winter 1996-1997, at 55, 56. This crime can be a major security problem for 
Western nations. For instance, governmental corruption effectively permitted the 
sale of nuclear material after the end of the Cold War. Id. 
189. See Transparency Int’l, Corruption in Humanitarian Aid (Transparency 
International, Working Paper No. 3, 2006), available at http:// 
www.transparency.org/content/download/6474/38543/file/working_paper_human
itarian_aid.pdf (discussing how corruption directs aid funds away from the 
intended population); Transparency Int’l, Corruption and HIV/AIDS 
(Transparency International, Working Paper No. 2, 2006), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/policy_positions/ti_pp 
_hiv (discussing how corruption undermines efforts to combat the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, particularly in Africa). 
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do not pay bribes are at a competitive disadvantage for government 
procurement contracts.190 
The paradigmatic case of corruption is a government procurement contract 
(such as the contract to build a road, construct a power plant, or purchase 
military equipment), where the government official accepts the bid from the 
private firm that offers the highest bribe rather than the best economic value for 
the country.191 Bribery can engage lower-level government officials as well, as is 
the case with bribery of customs officials not to collect taxes or of inspectors to 
overlook violations of labor regulations.192 In some regions, bribery of 
government officials is necessary to receive government services, such as 
receiving police protection or filing a lawsuit.193 
International efforts to fight corruption have focused primarily on the 
supply side.194 That is, anticorruption efforts have targeted the bribers—the 
private actors offering payments to government officials—rather than the 
officials accepting the bribes. This path is taken for pragmatic reasons; it does 
not reflect a moral view that offering a bribe is worse than accepting a bribe. 
Foreign states that enact anticorruption measures often do not have jurisdiction 
over the foreign government actors who elicit or accept bribes. By contrast, 
foreign nations frequently do have jurisdiction over the multinational 
corporations who offer the bribes. 
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Preventing international corruption requires collective action; the actions 
of one state alone cannot provide the good. Addressing the issue of 
international corruption requires coordination of the governments that regulate 
multinational corporations operating in their jurisdiction.195 Attempts by a 
single government to fight international corruption are likely to be ineffective 
because other companies outside of the regulating state’s jurisdiction can 
continue to offer bribes. Thus, the regulating government is putting itself at a 
competitive disadvantage while not achieving the goal of eliminating 
governmental corruption.196 
This national legislation has important political feedback effects. As the 
next Section describes, multinational corporations that operate in jurisdictions 
that adopt anticorruption legislation will suffer competitive disadvantages 
relative to companies that operate in jurisdictions that do not have such rules. 
Perhaps counterintuitively, this creates a positive feedback effect. The regulated 
multinational corporations will thus support an international agreement that 
extends anticorruption rules to more jurisdictions.197 There are negative 
feedback effects as well. Firms located in countries that do not regulate 
international corruption will have a competitive advantage over their regulated 
competitors.198 Thus, these firms may resist an international agreement to 
maintain their advantage.199 We see both of these effects at work in the 
development of the FCPA and OECD treaty on anticorruption efforts.200 
 
B. Background to the FCPA 
 
In 1977, in the wake of the international corruption scandals that became 
public during the Watergate hearings, the United States passed its first iteration 
of the FCPA.201 The Act, which applies to all American corporations, 
criminalizes any attempt to bribe a foreign government official done with the 
purpose of obtaining or retaining business.202 American corporations vocally 
protested the implementation of the FCPA because the Act was viewed as 
putting American corporations at a competitive disadvantage to European or 
 
195. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 186, at S161-62. 
196. David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a 
New International Legal Consensus, 18 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 457, 461 (1998). 
197. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 186, at S162; Low, supra note 193, at 153; Tarullo, supra 
note 185, at 675. 
198. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 186, at S164; Tarullo, supra note 185, at 674. 
199. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 186, at S162-64; Tarullo, supra note 185, at 674, 687. 
200. Tarullo, supra note 185, at 668-80. 
201. Gantz, supra note 196, at 459; George et al., supra note 194, at 5; Alejandro 
Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 Duke J. Comp. & 
Int’l L. 345, 348-59 (2000). 
202. Low, supra note 193, at 151-52 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a) (1994)). 
Article - Rachel Brewster - 23 - Final - 2010.07.01 7/6/2010  9:31:53 AM 
STEPPING STONE OR STUMBLING BLOCK  
 307 
Asian enterprises.203 The FCPA did not apply to foreign corporations unless 
they had sufficient contacts within the United States or conducted some part of 
the bribery scheme within the territory of the United States.204 Of equal 
importance, in 1977, the United States government was the only government to 
prohibit the bribery of foreign officials abroad.205 The President insisted that 
other states would follow the country’s lead and adopt similar restrictions, but 
other governments declined to do so.206 
After the passage of the FCPA, American firms faced a significant 
disadvantage when competing for international contracts.207 American firms 
were subject to civil and criminal penalties if they offered “anything of value” to 
foreign officials for the purposes of obtaining or retaining business.208 By 
contrast, European and Asian firms could continue to offer bribes abroad and 
not fear prosecution under the laws of their home countries, if not the laws of 
the host country. In fact, many governments classified foreign bribes as a tax-
deductible business expense.209 The FCPA hurt American business abroad. 
Although it is always difficult to put a dollar amount on the losses from such a 
policy, one accounting put the loss at $5.5 billion per year.210 
The passage of the FCPA gave non-American firms a competitive 
advantage. Foreign governments and firms recognized this advantage. As 
Patrick Glynn describes:  
Since Congress’s passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, 
European and Asian states have been by and large content to regard the 
US law as yet another peculiar expression on America’s Puritanism 
penchant for international moralizing. Industrial countries continued 
to permit their firms to bribe abroad and deduct such bribes on tax 
returns; not only were European and other governments happy to reap 
the competitive windfall from America’s lonely boy scout posture, but 
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anecdotal evidence suggests that some European embassies also even 
facilitate such bribery in foreign capitals.211 
Daniel Tarullo quotes a European official as stating that his country’s 
companies needed a competitive advantage over their more efficient U.S. 
competitors.212  
American industry took a two-track approach to addressing this 
competitive disadvantage.213 First, many American firms sought to repeal or 
significantly weaken the FCPA.214 This approach was opposed by some 
American businesses that perceived anticorruption policies as good business 
practices and sought to keep at least their American rivals bound to the same 
rules.215 Second, American firms pushed the United States government to 
negotiate an international anticorruption agreement.216 The goal of the 
international agreement was to level the playing field by imposing the same 
constraints on foreign rivals.217 American industry was nearly unanimous in its 
support for an international agreement because it both embodied 
anticorruption principles and eliminated the competitive disadvantage.218 An 
international agreement was preferable to national action because it would be 
“collective disarmament” rather than “unilateral disarmament.”219 
 
C. International Negotiations at the OECD 
 
Although the United States government attempted for several decades to 
negotiate an international anticorruption agreement, other governments were 
(perhaps unsurprisingly) less than receptive.220 The FCPA had in fact created a 
competitive advantage for foreign firms, and foreign governments were 
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reluctant to forego that advantage.221 From 1977 to 1994, American efforts to 
reach an international agreement on anticorruption efforts went nowhere.222 It 
was not until the late 1990s that an OECD anticorruption treaty gained 
sufficient political support, when the European public’s shock from a series of 
national corruption scandals allowed popular support for anticorruption efforts 
to overcome industrial opposition to such policies.223 The European public’s 
support for an anticorruption treaty itself may have been, in part, the product 
of growing anticorruption norms fostered by organizations such as 
Transparency International.224 
In 1999, over two decades after the United States passed the FCPA, an 
OECD treaty that criminalized the offer of bribes to foreign public officials 
became effective.225 Compliance with the OECD treaty is lacking because 
governments see an advantage to cheating on the agreement.226 For instance, 
the Blair Government halted an investigation examining the alleged bribery of 
Saudi officials by its national aerospace company, British Aerospace 
Engineering (BAE).227 The evidence from other countries is mixed. Some 
European governments appear similarly reluctant to enforce anticorruption 
measures rigorously,228 but others are increasing their enforcement efforts. For 
instance, the German government brought prosecution against Siemens for its 
use of bribes overseas.229 Siemens settled the case by paying over $1 billion in 
fines.230 Yet the U.S. Department of Justice remains responsible for over half of 
all foreign bribery prosecutions in OECD countries even though it accounts for 
only 10% of OECD exports.231 Although the treaty is in place, some domestic 
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governments may still want to maintain a competitive advantage for their 
national firms.232  
 
D. The Dynamic Effects of National Legislation in Providing Global Public 
Goods 
 
The FCPA legislation highlights the benefits and the pitfalls of unilateral 
national legislation in negotiating an international agreement. Unilateral action 
at the national level changes bargaining at the international level.233 In the FCPA 
case, the United States legislation had two dynamic political feedback effects. 
For American firms, the FCPA created a competitive constraint; U.S. companies 
were barred from using the business practices that their international 
competitors used. This constraint actually created a demand among domestic 
firms for an international agreement. Because American firms were bound by 
antibribery laws, they wanted their foreign rivals to face the same restrictions.234 
For foreign firms, the United States legislation created an unexpected 
competitive advantage. Non-American companies obtained international 
business through corruption, which they would not otherwise have received.235 
Once granted this advantage, foreign firms (and their governments) resisted 
attempts to address global corruption for two decades.236 
Analyzing the ultimate usefulness of the FCPA in advancing international 
efforts to curb global corruption is difficult because it requires constructing a 
counterfactual situation; we do not know how anticorruption efforts would 
have proceeded without the FCPA. But the costs and the benefits of the national 
legislation become clearer when the law is considered as part of a dynamic 
process of international bargaining regarding a public good. The FCPA 
certainly decreased the number of bribes offered by American corporations, but 
it did not necessarily aid the cause of eliminating international corruption, since 
non-American firms did not face similar restrictions. A market for bribes 
continued to exist. The FCPA certainly helped catalyze an American business 
campaign to create a treaty regime to address international corruption. This 
effort probably would not have come into being without the FCPA. But the 
FCPA also created resistance to an international agreement among foreign firms 
and governments. The members of the OECD have subsequently settled on an 
international agreement that criminalizes bribery of foreign government 
officials. But is this a success? The treaty came into force twenty-two years after 
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the United States enacted the FCPA. Without the negative feedback effect 
created by United States action, a treaty might have been possible long before 
1999. The same dynamics that led foreign governments to resist a treaty still 
exist and arguably cause those governments to adopt lax enforcement 
procedures. There is no certain answer to whether the passage of the FCPA was 
a wise decision if the goal of the United States government was to reduce global 
corruption. To evaluate this legislation properly, we must take into account the 
effect of the FCPA on actors at home and abroad. But we can say that the 
national legislation had mixed effects on international anticorruption efforts; it 
shifted the bargaining environment at the international level for good and for 
ill.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Deciding whether to pursue incremental legislation is a constant dilemma 
in political life.237 A partial measure is more easily achieved and provides 
supporters with limited benefits. Incremental steps also have dynamic effects; 
the interim measure alters political conditions going forward.238 A half measure 
influences when (and if) policymakers will return to issue in the future and 
affects public support for additional measures.239 These dynamic effects of 
incremental legislation can be positive or negative; they can build greater 
support for a more comprehensive regime or undermine progress on a policy 
agenda.  
The importance of dynamic political feedback effects of incremental 
measures is heightened when addressing issues that require international 
cooperation, where national measures are often a prelude to international 
negotiations. This truth is particularly salient when addressing global public 
goods. Unlike international arenas where recalcitrant countries can be cut out 
of the benefits of cooperation (such as international trade),240 the global 
commons is nonexcludable.241 As this Article discusses, a solution to the climate 
change crisis requires multilateral cooperation. National legislation is easier to 
achieve in the short term, but depending on the dynamic effects of the 
legislation, it may or may not be beneficial to the long-term goal of crafting a 
comprehensive solution. 
As a consequence, the question of how national-level measures affect 
international negotiations should be central in evaluating the merits of national 
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legislation. This requires a change from the traditional orientation of 
considering national measures to one that incorporates the insights of the two-
level game. These insights include a more international view of the effect of 
legislation, examining not only the effects of the legislation at home but the 
effects on domestic politics in foreign countries as well. In addition, we must 
focus more attention on the mechanisms that lead to dynamic political change, 
analyze the productive and counterproductive effects of each, and construct 
legislation to promote positive feedback effects. National legislation at one 
point in time can help shape what is politically feasible (domestically and 
internationally) later in time. An agreement that is not possible now may 
become so if national legislation is crafted carefully to build greater support for 
an international agreement over time.  
